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Reputations once acquired are hard to shed. The stereotype of 
the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) as an opportunist, conservative 
party composed of Javanese prijaji elements remains despite basic 
changes which occurred within the party in the later years of Guided 
Democracy. Tljis undifferentiated image of the PNI arose in the early 
1950's and, for that time, it represented a fairly accurate, though 
limited, description. As the party began to change under the impetus 
of Guided Democracy politics and the push of internal party dynamics, 
Indonesian and foreign observers either disregarded the party alto­
gether or tended to seek explanations for these changes in outside 
factors." Thus, the PNI's "turn to the left," in the 1963 to 1965 
period, was termed variously as: an opportunistic response to the
increasingly leftist politics of Guided Democracy; the result of 
strong pressure from President Sukarno; or the work of PKI (Communist 
Party) infiltration of the party leadership.
The fact that Djakarta's political cognoscenti-- journalists and 
intellectuals--continue to espouse and disseminate this interpreta­
tion reflects biases born of their own political attitudes and in­
volvement. A similarly-limited view of the PNI in Western academic 
literature is in part the result of the paucity of work on the Guided 
Democracy period and in part a consequence of an excessive concentra­
tion on a few actors at the center. The generally-accepted framework 
for analyzing Guided Democracy politics1--a three-sided triangle made 
up of Sukarno, the Army and the PKI--only explains certain facets of 
Indonesian politics, that is, the major battles for ideological and 
institutional predominance. But it disregards the role which less 
prominent groups, such as the PNI and the other political parties, 
had in making lower-level political decisions. It explains Djakarta 
politics but disregards local conflicts.
The lack of academic attention given to the PNI after the aban­
donment of electoral politics in the late 1950's, parallels an in­
creasing emphasis on the rising power of Sukarno, the Army and the 
Communists. But it also results from the tendency in Western litera­
ture on political parties to focus on electoral and legislative 
politics. Concepts and methodologies developed for the study of 
political parties apply largely to those parties which function in 
conditions of electoral competition. Little work has been done on 
non-Communist political parties operating in countries in which no 
elections have been held for a long time.
The Radical Nationalists--1946-1956
The post-independence Partai Nasional Indonesia was founded at 
Kediri, East Java, in January 1946, by leaders of Serindo (Serikat
1. See, for example, Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in 
Ruth McVey, ed., Indonesia (New Haven: HRAF, 1963), pp. 309-409.
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Rakjat Indonesia), an organization formed the preceding December in 
Djakarta. At the Kediri Congress, Serindo joined with a number of 
smaller parties from Central and East Java and a few groups from 
Sumatra and Sulawesi to form a new party, the PNI. The new party was 
comprised mainly of clusters of local notables (such as, lawyers, 
civil servants and school teachers) from the larger towns in Repub­
lican areas. Its leadership consisted of former activists in the 
pre-war PNI, Partindo, and Gerindo, plus a few Parindra people.2
During the revolutionary period, 1945-1949, the top PNI leader­
ship opposed negotiations with the Dutch and generally disagreed 
with the policies of the Socialist-dominated governments of Sjahrir 
and Sjarifuddin. They supported the oppostionist front (Persatuan 
Perdjoangan) created by Tan Malaka, and attacked both the Linggadjati 
and the Renville agreements with the Dutch. Maintaining strict party 
discipline, however, proved difficult, and individual PNI leaders 
sometimes joined cabinets whose policies the rest of the party hier­
archy opposed. Moreover, the party had no organized mass support. 
Unlike the Masjumi and the Socialist Party, for example, it was never 
even able to develop an effective para-military affiliate.
Except for a short period in 1947, the national leadership of 
the PNI was controlled by people from the pre-war PNI and the 
Partindo. Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro,3 4 Sartono,1* and Sidik Djojosukarto5
2. The pre-war PNI was formed by Sukarno and a few friends in July
1927 . Successful at first, it was disbanded after Sukarno was 
jailed by the Dutch. In the last decade before World War II, the 
former PNI leadership was scattered among a variety of secular 
nationalist parties, the most important of which were: 1) Partindo
(Indonesian Party), formed in 1931 by Sartono, who had taken the 
decision to dissolve the PNI; 2) PNI-Baru (New PNI) formed in 1932 
by those who had opposed the decision to disband; 3) Parindra 
(Greater Indonesia Party), formed in 1935 by Dr. Sutomo, after
the banning of the previous two parties, and generally following 
a "cooperation" policy; and 4) Gerindo (Indonesian People's Move­
ment), formed in 1937 by A. K. Gani, which took a stance to the 
left of Parindra.
3. Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro was born in Surakarta on May 23, 1904; he 
was educated at a teachers' school, and spent the major part of 
the 'twenties and 'thirties as a Taman Siswa teacher. He later 
headed the education section of the Central Headquarters of the 
Djawa Hookookai .
Before the war, Sarmidi was a member of the PNI (in 1928) and 
later an officer in both Partindo and Gerindo. He was the general 
secretary of Serindo in 1945, and, at the fusion congress in Febru­
ary 19 46, he was elected chairman of the PNI. He was replaced by 
A. K. Gani as chairman in March 1947, and, subsequently, he occupied 
various positions in the top party leadership until his death on 
June 8, 1957. He was an active member of Parliament from 1945 
until his death. Suluh Indonesia, August 1, 1956.
4. Sartono was born on August 5, 1900, at Surakarta. He earned his 
law degree from Leiden in 1925.
He was vice-chairman of the PNI in 1928, then of Partindo and 
Gerindo. In 1945, he served as a member of the Serindo working 
committee, was head of the political section of the PNI Central 
Headquarters in 1946 and of the organization section from 1947 to
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dominated the party, giving it a "radical nationalist” orientation 
and provoking the departure of the more conservative elements. In 
1948, senior Javanese civil servants and leaders from Kalimantan 
and Sulawesi broke away and formed the Persatuan Indonesia Raja 
(Greater Indonesia Union, PIR). In another split, in 1950, the re­
maining ex-Parindra leaders left and formed the Partai Rakjat Nasional 
(National People's Party, PRN).
With the departure of these groups, the radical nationalists, 
under Sidik Ujojsukarto, increased their control over the party. In 
1950, they spearheaded the drive for the creation of a unitary state, 
opposing the Hatta and Natsir cabinets. Following the fall of the 
Natsir cabinet, from which the PNI had been excluded, the party 
steadily increased its influence in succeeding cabinets. At first, 
the character of its participation was determined largely by which 
of its leaders were acceptable to the Masjumi-dominated cabinet co­
alitions. The PNI ministers tended to be drawn from a group of 
younger men, graduates of the Batavia Law Faculty in the late pre­
war period, who lacked strong nationalist credentials. They shared 
with the cabinet leadership a belief in the need to emphasize techni­
cal and administrative skills in government. The increase in PNI 
participation of this kind was marked by the appointment of Suwirjo 
as vice-premier in the Sukiman cabinet (April 1951-February 1952) 
and Wilopo as prime minister of the cabinet which succeeded it.
Despite participation of men like Suwirjo and Wilopo in national 
government, the older leaders retained their domination of party 
councils. Moreover, Sidik and Sarmidi came into increasing conflict 
with the PNI cabinet ministers since they believed that radical 
nationalist goals should be given priority over the pursuit of ad­
ministrative efficiency and economic stability. For example, when 
the Sukiman-Suwirjo government was discovered to have committed 
itself to accepting US aid under the terms of the Mutual Security 
Act, the Party Council joined the opposition which brought down the 
cabinet. In December 1952, at the Sixth Party Congress, held in
1949, when he became chairman of Parliament (.a position he 
occupied until 1960) . Kami Perkenalkan (Djakarta: Kementerian 
Penerangan, 1954), p. 66; Empat Windu PNI (Semarang: ~Dewan Daerah 
PNI, Djawa Tengah, 1959).
5. Sidik Djojosukarto was born in Blitar, East Java, on June 7, 1908. 
His formal education was limited to high school plus a few years 
in a commercial school. He was chairman of the Djawa Hookookai 
for the Residency of Kediri during the Japanese occupation.
Before the war, he belonged to both Partindo and Gerindo. He 
served as head of the PNI in East Java from 1945 to 1949, when he 
became acting chairman of the party replacing Sujono Hadinoto. He 
was reelected chairman at the Fourth Party Congress in May 1950 and 
served until his death on September 8, 1955. Of all the party's 
leaders, he came closest to being an authentic party hero; his 
memory is revered by all factions. He was the only party chairman 
who was comfortable both among the peasant members in the villages 
and among the elite of Djakarta. Though named cabinet formateur 
several times, he refused to become a minister, preferring instead 
to remain party chairman. Suluh Indonesia, September 10, 1955.
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Surabaja, the PNI ministers in the Wilopo cabinet were severely criti­
cized for their policy of returning to the Royal Dutch Shell Corporation 
the oil wells in North Sumatra which had been taken over on a tempor­
ary basis by the Indonesian government at the end of the revolution.
They were also attacked for their policy of appeasement towards the 
leaders of the October 17, 1952 attempted army coup.
The first cabinet which the Sidik leadership fully supported was 
that headed by Ali Sastroamidjojo (August 1953-July 1955). The party 
leadership had exercised more control over the selection of cabinet 
ministers and was able to impose strict rules on relations between the 
party and its ministers. The Ali cabinet worked to disband the Dutch- 
Indonesian Union and renegotiate existing treaties with the Dutch. It 
generally took an active anti-colonialist position in international 
relations. Government resources were used to encourage national (in­
digenous) entrepreneurs. These policies marked a definite break with 
the course set during the Sukiman and the Wilopo cabinets. But the 
radical nationalists’ victory coincided with other political develop­
ments which were to lead to their downfall within a couple of years.
The Conservative Leadership--1956-1960
During the years of the revolution, the PNI was supported pri­
marily by groups of local notables on Java. When the party began to 
expand after 1950, it tended to do so outwards rather than downwards, 
coopting similar groups in areas like North and South Sumatra, North 
Sulawesi and Bali. As the central government moved to increase its 
presence outside of Java, the PNI utilized its base in the bureaucracy 
to organize branches in the government's wake. In addition, in 1951 
and 1952, many former leaders of the discredited Dutch-sponsored 
federal states in the outer islands, who were anxious to rehabilitate 
themselves and find political security, hastened to join the anti- 
federal PNI .
The number of people involved in making party decisions, how­
ever, remained relatively small. Local party branches often had 
little contact with provincial organizations and even less with 
Central Headquarters. As a result, the central leadership, under the 
firm grip of Sidik and Sarmidi, could set the party on a radical na­
tionalist course in Djakarta without much interference from conserva­
tive local party branches.
By 1954, the situation had begun to change under the impetus of 
the accelerating election campaign. PNI leaders became increasingly 
aware that success in the elections would depend on their capacity 
to amass funds and to expand party membership in short order.
The PNI had control over the key Economic Affairs Ministry in 
both the Wilopo and Ali cabinets, and, in the latter, also controlled 
the Ministry of Finance. It used this control to raise campaign 
funds by exacting informal levies on businessmen to whom its minis­
ters awarded licenses, import facilities and government loans.6
6. Speaking at a conference of PNI branches on January 1, 1956, in Bali, 
Hardi warned that the party would have to seek new sources of 
funds for the 1959 elections because of the protests which arose 
as a result of the use of "special licenses" in 1953-1954. Minutes
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Patronage was also available through other important ministries. As 
a result, the party attracted into its ranks a variety of entre­
preneurs whose aims in joining were financial rather than ideologi­
cal. Moreover, in the absence of a well-organized apparatus down 
to the village level, the party felt compelled to take a short cut 
by enlisting the support of government officials, school teachers 
and other local notables who were believed to command votes on the 
basis of personal ties.
As the party admitted more and more such people, its selectivity 
decreased. Though these new recruits differed little in terms of 
class derivations or social status from existing members, the condi­
tions of their entry into party ranks did. The people who enrolled 
in the party during the years when it was out of power joined through 
a feeling of commitment to a political movement, and their affirma­
tion of party goals and ideals was based on years of participation 
in the nationalist struggle before the war. The people who joined 
after 1954 entered an organization that was beginning to look more 
and more like a Western-style political machine.
The influx of these new elements plus the need to elaborate 
party organization in local areas for campaign purposes weakened the 
grip of the Sidik group on the party. Sidik could no longer commit 
the party to specific policies merely by consulting a small number 
of party leaders at the top; greater efforts had now to be made to 
include local branches in party decision-making.
The party's victory in the elections of 1955 accelerated 
the pace of its transformation into a conservative political machine.7 
A large number of the party's branch leaders now sat in Parliament 
and the Constituent Assembly; this removed many of the most com­
mitted leaders from local branches,which facilitated the entry of 
the new, and often opportunist, recruits into local party leadership. 
Meanwhile, the death of Sidik Djojosukarto, in September 1955, had 
deprived the radical nationalist wing of its dominant figure.
Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro, who succeeded him in this role, did not have 
the same degree of personal charisma. This development shifted the 
balance of power within the older leadership back towards such men 
as Suwirjo and Wilopo. When, at the Eighth Party Congress, in 
July 1956, at Semarang, elections were held for the party chairman­
ship, the new, conservative elements backed the candidacy of Suwirjo 
and ensured his narrow victory over Sarmidi.8
of the Conference (mimeographed), pp. 43, 45.
An indicator of the expansion of party activities is the bud­
get of the Central Headquarters. For the whole year 1953, it was 
Rp. 540,937.70, while for the first ten months of 1954, it was 
Rp. 1,842,079.77. Laporan Kongres Ke-VII (Bandung, December 15- 
22, 1954), pp. 44-457
7. The PNI won 22.3% of the total vote in the elections. The next
three parties were: Masjumi (20.9%); Nahdatul Ulama (18.4%); and
the PKI (16.4%). Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 
(Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1957), pp. 58-65.
8. Sarmidi lost to Suwirjo by only 93 out of a total of 6,187 votes 
cast. Suluh Indonesia, July 31, 1956.
Suwirjo was born in Surakarta, on February 17, 1903. Educated 
in Dutch elementary and high schools, he attended the Batavia Law
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The Eighth Party Congress also adopted important changes in the 
party's organizational structure.9 The National Party Council pre­
viously had comprised a small group appointed by the Central Head­
quarters, but the revised rules created a new party representative 
body, the Congress Working Committee (Badan Pekerdja Kongres), which 
was larger and included members chosen by provincial party committees. 
It also possessed more extensive powers for setting party policy.
These organizational changes had disastrous consequences for the 
party. The accelerating national crisis after 1957 posed many chal­
lenges, but'Suwirjo and his associates never managed to develop a 
coherent strategy for dealing with them. On the central issue of 
the period--the Army-Sukarno anti-party and anti-Parliament drive-- 
they allowed themselves to be pulled from side to side by forces 
within and without the party.
An example of the PNI's indecisiveness and vacillation was the 
leadership's attitude toward regional dissidents in 1957 and later.
In general, the leadership supported the central government position, 
but never wholeheartedly, because it was concerned about losing sup­
port of its branches in the outer islands if it took too strong a 
position. The PKI's success in the provincial elections in the sum­
mer of 1957 thoroughly alarmed the party leadership. Blaming the 
Communists for "political treachery," that is, for "poaching" on the 
PNI's own electoral preserves in Java,10 they began to look at the 
Masjumi and PSI as potential allies for containing the Communists' 
advance. Accordingly, they were worried that the dissident regional 
movements, in which Masjumi and the PSI were deeply involved, would 
so discredit these parties that they would be useless as anti­
communist allies.
Faculty (1924-27 and 1936-37) though he never attained his degree. 
He held various jobs as teacher and businessman before the war and 
was a member of the Djawa Hookookai national leadership. In 1950, 
he was the Mayor of Djakarta. In 1953, he became President-Direc­
tor of the Bank Industri Negara, an experience which made him 
generally sympathetic to business interests.
Suwirjo served as secretary of the Djakarta branch of the PNI 
from 1927-1928, then as Partindo national treasurer and head of 
its Djakarta branch. He was a member of the Serindo working com­
mittee in 1945. When PNI Headquarters moved to Jogja in 1946, he 
ceased to play a role in the party leadership. In 1950, Head­
quarters was returned to Djakarta, and he served on the Working 
Committee. He was first vice-chairman of the Party Council from 
1952 to 1954, a position which he lost to Sarmidi at the Seventh 
Party Congress. Suwirjo served as vice-premier in the Sukiman 
cabinet. Suluh Indonesia, July 31, 1956; Empat Windu, pp. 154- 
222; Orang-Orang Indonesia jang Terkemuka di Djawa (Djakarta: 
Gunseikanbu, 1944), p. 277.
Suwirjo's closeness to Wilopo partly reflected their common 
experience as students at the Batavia Law Faculty and as teachers 
at the Perguruan Rakjat, the nationalist school in Batavia, in 
the late 1930's.
9. Anggaran Dasar-Anggaran Rumah Tangga PNI (Djakarta; DPP-PNI,
1957) .
10. Party leaders could not see that the PKI's electoral success re­
sulted from its solid organizational work or that their own elec­
toral failures stemmed from an increasing identification with the 
country's corrupt elite.
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The party's role in the anti-Parliament campaign of the late 
'fifties also reflected great vacillation. The PNI was to suffer 
the most from the decline of Indonesia's parliamentary institutions. 
But, ironically, it was a PNI-dominated cabinet that declared martial 
law in March 1957 and thus legitimized army intervention in civilian 
politics. The party leadership also refused to see that Sukarno's 
political initiatives were antithetical to its own interests. Count­
ing on Sukarno's identification as the founder of the pre-war PNI, 
the party tried to benefit from his increasing political power while 
opposing his specific moves against the party system and Parliament. 
In late 1958, the PNI tried to mobilize the other political parties 
into a Front Pantja Si la for the defense of Parliament. The effort 
was stillborn because of the same indecisiveness that had character­
ized other PNI moves since 1956.
I] arly 1960, the party flirted with the idea of joining the 
Liga Demokrasi (Democratic League), an organization which opposed 
Sukarno's announced plan for an appointive parliament. The Liga 
was supported by some Masjumi and Socialist leaders, as well as 
various army officers. Suwirjo only declared the PNI against it 
after pressure was exerted by younger leaders. In the end, the party 
leadership acquiesced in Sukarno's emasculation of parliamentary 
government in exchange for a few extra seats in the new, appointive 
Gotong-Rojong Parliament.
Radical Resurgence
The party leadership's failure to confront Indonesia's political 
crisis in a coherent way also had severe consequences for internal 
party politics. During the years of Suwirjo's leadership (1956- 
1960), chaos pervaded the party's provincial network. In East Java, 
one group of party activists openly criticized their provincial 
leadership. In South Sumatra, and in North and South Sulawesi, 
dissident factions set up their own provincial committees. Top 
party leaders, such as Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo and Sartono, were known 
to hold critical views on Suwirjo's compromises with Sukarno and the 
Army.
The result was a growing challenge to the party leadership, mani­
fested when some left-wing leaders broke away to form a new party, 
Partindo, in August 1958. Though the new party did not attract many 
PNI members to its ranks, it presented an effective critique of 
Suwirjo's leadership which had important repercussions within the PNI. 
Widely publicized statements by Partindo leaders at the time of the 
split criticized the PNI leadership for the discrepancy between its 
rhetoric and its actions. Partindo leaders, in particular Asmara 
Hadi, questioned the PNI's professed dedication to the cause of the 
rakjat Marhaen (the common people), since the party refused to act 
against the landlords, big businessmen and corrupt politicians within 
its own ranks. Partindo proposed a redefinition of the PNI ideo 
Marhaenism, which would link it directly to Marxist class analys 1
11. Pulihkan Marhaenisme (Djakarta: Badan Pelaksana Koreksi-Konsolidasi 
PNI, 1958); Asmara Hadi, Rintisan ke Marhaenisme Adjaran Bung 
Karno (Djakarta: Pengurus Besar Partindo, 1961), a pamphlet con­
taining articles written by Asmara Hadi for Sin Po, dating back 
to 1958.
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The Partindo attack followed the lines of Sukarno's general offensive 
against the party system and served further to weaken PNI resistance.
At the same time, the young leaders of the PNI ormas12 began 
challenging the Suwirjo leadership. This was even more damaging than 
the Partindo split because it came from within and because these 
groups were aided by Sukarno and the Army, who had begun to encourage 
the growth of ormas as another tactic in the campaign against politi­
cal parties. The Army, for example, had organized numerous Badan 
Kerdja Sama.(Cooperation Committees) as a means to spread its influ­
ence over youth, labor and peasant organizations. Sukarno had forced 
the political parties to agree to the inclusion of functional groups 
in the Gotong-Rojong Parliament and other Guided Democracy consulta­
tive bodies.
In deciding who should fill the seats allotted to functional 
groups, such as women, youth, and peasants, the Army, hoping to 
curtail the influence of the PKI, frequently threw its weight behind 
leaders of the various PNI ormas. This development gave these leaders 
unprecedented prestige and made available to them financial and 
patronage resources which helped them attract new, young, energetic 
members. With the active encouragement of President Sukarno through 
PNI ministers such as Sadjarwo (agriculture) and Ahem Erningpradja 
(labor) and the chairman of the National Council (Dewan Nasional),13 14
Ruslan Abdulgani,111 the PNI ormas began to exert their influence
12. Ormas is an abbreviation of the Indonesian phrase organisasi massa 
[lit. mass organization] and refers to organizations affiliated to 
the parties and to the Army, such as youth, women's, workers', 
peasants', intellectuals', etc., organizations. Although they are 
called mass organizations, the word "mass" in many cases repre­
sents the aspirations rather than the reality of the organiza­
tions ' membership.
The major PNI mass organizations were: 1) youth: Pemuda
Demokrat Indonesia, PDI (Indonesian Democratic Youth), later 
Gerakan Pemuda Marhaenis, GPM (Marhaenist Youth Movement); 2) 
students: Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, GMNI (Indonesian 
Nationalist Student Movement); Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia, 
GSNI (Indonesian Nationalist High School Student Movement); 3)
intellectuals, professionals and artists: Ikatan Sardjana Repub- 
lik Indonesia”, ISRI (Indonesian Republican Scholars' League);
4) women: Wanita Demokrat Indonesia, WDI (Indonesian Democratic 
Women), later Wanita Marhaenis, WM (Marhaenist Women); 5) workers: 
Kesatuan Buruh Kerakjatan Indonesia, KBKI (Indonesian National 
Workers' Federation), later Kesatuan Buruh Marhaenis, KBM 
(Marhaenist Workers' Federation); 6) peasants: Persatuan Tani
Nasional Indonesia, Petani (Indonesian National Peasants' Union).
13. The Dewan Nasional was set up in 1957. It was composed of func­
tional representatives and was intended by Sukarno to undercut 
the prestige and power of Pari ament and the cabinet. It was 
responsible to him as chairman but daily leadership was exercised 
by vice-chairman Ruslan Abdulgani. Though it had no executive 
powers, it did exercise considerable influence, at least at the 
beginning.
14. Ahejn Erningpradja was chairman of the PNI labor federation KBKI 
from 1954 to 1962. He was a member of Parliament as a represent­
ative of SOBSI and a national vice-chairman of Sarbupri.
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within the party in favor of Guided Democracy policies. In January 
1959, the GMNI announced its support for the National Council pro­
posals that functional groups receive 50% of the parliamentary 
seats, though at the same time, the party leaders were opposing 
identical proposals.15 In May 1960, leaders from the PNI ormas 
wrote a statement condemning the Liga Demokrasi and then pressured 
Suwirjo into signing it; this angered elements in the party leader­
ship who were sympathetic to the Liga.16
Efforts by the ormas leaders to change party attitudes towards 
Guided Democracy reached a climax at the Ninth Party Congress held 
in Solo, in July 1960, at which they issued a pamphlet entitled 
Appeal Djuli i960 (generally known as the Buku Merah, or Red Book), 
which attacked the Suwirjo group. It criticized these leaders for 
allowing "pro-federalist, feudal, bureaucratic, capitalist and land­
lord elements" to dominate the party and attributed the party's de­
clining political influence to its obstruction of the drive toward 
Guided Democracy.
The radical nationalists of the old Sidik group joined with the 
ormas to prevent Suwirjo's reelection and to install Ali Sastroamidjojo, 
a former Sidik ally, as the new chairman. The ormas' representation 
in the national party leadership considerably increased. The organ­
izational changes made at the 1956 Congress were reversed, and the 
national leadership received increased powers at the expense of 
local party committees. This return to centralized party leadership 
favored the activists from the ormas because these groups had their 
greatest strength in Djakarta.
It is important to understand the context in which the balance 
of power within the party was changing. The power of the more con­
servative, provincial notables, who had elected Suwirjo chairman in 
1957, was seriously reduced by Army prohibitions on party political 
activity in the regions after June 1959. Furthermore, the govern-
Parlaungan, Tokoh-Tokoh Parlemen (Djakarta: Gita, 1956), p. 41.
Sadjarwo, a former officer of the BTI, joined the PNI in 
1957 and became second vice-chairman of the Petani in 1959.
Empat Windu, p. 221.
Ruslan Abdulgani was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 
second Ali cabinet. He was not formally active in the party or 
any of its ormas at this time. Suara Marhaenis, 6, no. 2 (March 
31, 1956), p. 7.
15. GMNI Statement, No. 59016/DPP/ '59, January 23, 1959. The forum 
in which the party leaders expressed their opposition was the 
Bogor Open Talks, held between Sukarno, the cabinet and the 
political parties on the changes to be made in the Parliament.
16. The first Central Headquarters instruction to its branches 
("Pendjelasan dan Instruksi Sekitar Liga Demokrasi," No. 
205/Pol/26/'60, April 28, 1960) told them to remain neutral on 
the issue. The May 27 statement was made in the name of the PNI 
and its ormas (PNI/Front Marhaenis). Suluh Indonesia, May 28, 
1960 .
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merit’s ban on party membership by senior civil servants particularly 
weakened the two most conservative provincial organizations, those 
of West and Central Java. Lastly, the onset of Guided Democracy and 
the consequent abandonment of electoral politics, meant that the 
local influence exerted by these groups was no longer as important 
as in earlier years. Since the ormas were not formally political, 
their activities were not inhibited by the Army prohibitions. The 
ormas were not primarily oriented to electoral politics and, as the 
political arena increasingly narrowed to Djakarta where they were 
strongest, so their influence grew. The ormas leaders soon developed 
the organizational skills and techniques of ideological mobilization 
which were required for success under Guided Democracy.
The more radical groups did not, however, achieve a total vic­
tory. “The election of Hardi17 as secretary-general and Suwirjo as 
first vice-chairman provided the conservative forces with strong 
representation in the central leadership. The battle lines within 
the party continued to be drawn between the faction dominated by the 
ormas leaders and that led by Hardi and supported by the West and 
Central Java provincial committees. The new chairman, Ali 
Sastroamidjojo,18 a consummate politician imbued with a healthy 
sense of self-preservation, often disappointed his supporters on the 
left by sitting in the middle.
17. Hardi was b o m  in Pati on May 23, 1918. He began work on his 
law degree at the Batavia Law Faculty and finished at Gadjah 
Mada; he also spent some years studying in England. He worked 
at the Pati Residency office during the occupation and, during 
the revolution, served on the governing council of the Special 
Region of Jogjakarta. After 1953, he was director of a life 
insurance company.
Before the war, Hardi was a member of Indonesia Muda. He 
joined the PNI in 1946 and was a member of the Party Council 
after 1950. He was vice-premier in the first Djuanda cabinet, 
during which time he earned the enmity of the pro-Sukarno forces 
in the party for opposing the initiatives toward Guided Democracy. 
Though in the 'sixties he denied this opposition, his speech 
delivered at the Congress Working Committee meeting in 1959 shows 
that his acceptance of Guided Democracy was less than whole­
hearted. Tokoh-Tokoh Parlemen, pp. 56-57.
18. Ali Sastroamidjojo was born in Magelang on May 21, 1903. He 
received his law degree from Leiden in 1927 and had a private 
law practice before the war. He occupied various bureaucratic 
positions in the occupation government.
He was active in the pre-war PNI, Partindo and Gerindo. During 
the revolution, he occupied various ministerial positions. He 
served as ambassador to the US from 1950 to 1953, became prime 
minister in 1953, and in 1957 was appointed ambassador to the UN.
His election at the 1960 Congress was not based simply on sup­
port from the party's leftist faction; he also won conservative 
votes from those impressed with his prominence in national politics 
since the revolution. His absence from Indonesia in the political­
ly volatile years, 1957 to 1960, had kept him away from the fierce 
battles within the party. He was associated with the radical 
nationalist Sidik leadership in the party but, at the time of 
his second cabinet in 1956-1957, he gained Sukarno’s enmity be­
cause he supported conservative policies. Tokoh-Tokoh Parlemen, 
pp. 43-44.
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The first battle was joined over the Buku Mevah incident. In­
sulted by the unfavorable treatment he received in the pamphlet,
Hardi insisted unsuccessfully that its signatories retract their 
statements and apologize. After this failure, Hardi and his sup­
porters, recognizing the new importance of the ormas in party 
politics, launched a campaign to capture control of them. At the 
April 1962 Congress of the GMNI, he attempted to engineer the elec­
tion of an ally as chairman, again without success. The tensions 
that were created by the campaign spread rapidly to the other ormas. 
When the Petani held its congress the following October, it proved 
impossible to elect a new leadership for fear that the organization 
would split. In the party's labor federation, the KBKI, the tension 
did result in a split, which developed at the end of 1962 over the 
issue of the composition of the organization's national leadership 
council.
The immediate cause of the KBKI split was a conflict over the 
inclusion of A. M. Datuk in the national leadership of this body. 
Because of Datuk's involvement with the Buku Mevah group, Hardi had 
blocked his membership in the National Party Council in 1960, and, 
at the Third KBKI Congress in July 1962, pro-Hardi forces within the 
federation had forced Datuk's relegation to a minor position in the 
leadership. Datuk then appealed to President Sukarno, who asked 
Ahem Erningpradj a, his labor minister and the reelected chairman of 
the KBKI, to give Datuk a better post. Caught between pressure from 
the Palace and his prior commitment to the party leadership, Ahem 
chose the Palace and formed a new KBKI leadership council with Datuk 
as one of the vice-chairmen. Considering this a breach of party 
discipline, Ali Sastroamidjojo, with the more than willing support 
of Hardi, expelled Datuk and Ahem from party membership and sponsored 
a KBKI leadership council of their own headed by Soerojo, even 
though the Ahem directorate insisted that they continued to repre­
sent the KBKI in the party.19
The expulsion of Ahem and Datuk represented a significant 
victory for the Hardi-led forces. The split also affected a number 
of leaders from the youth organization (PDI) and the university 
student association (GMNI), who had been associated with Datuk in 
the Buku Mevah episode. But this victory would prove short-lived, 
for other forces at work within the PNI would push the party farther 
and farther to the left in the period from 1963 to 1965.
The Tenth Party Congress-^Victory 
For the Left Wing
On May 1, 1963, martial law was finally lifted throughout the 
country. For six years, President Sukarno and the Army had used it 
to promulgate laws and decrees known to be opposed by the parties and
19. Ali Sastroamidjojo, "Tambahan Bahan-Bahan untuk Gambaran Objektif 
Sekitar Kongres KBKI ke-III di Bandung," and St. Rasjid Radja 
Emas, "Kristalisasi dalam Tubuh KBKI Front Marhaenis," both in 
Gelora Buruh, 1, no. 1 (1963) ; "Bahan-Bahan Mengenai Peristiwa 
DPS-KBKI," in, Lampiran Chusus dari Laporan Umum DPP-PNI didalam 
Kongres ke-X di Purwokerto (Mimeographed).
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more generally to restrict party activity. But Sukarno's concern 
with the inordinate power of the Army led him to renewed cooperation 
with the parties, and it was this coalition that in fact pushed 
through the revocation of martial law. After May 1963, the parties 
were able to operate more freely than before. Nonetheless, without 
elections or formal party representation in the "working cabinet,"20 
the parties' activities in the political system remained oriented 
towards mass action and generalized ideological appeals.
The PNI's Tenth Party Congress21 took place in the small Central 
Java town of Purwokerto, between August 28 and September 1, 1963, in 
an atmosphere heavy with tension created by a Hardi-led campaign to 
remove Ali as party chairman. As part of this manoeuvering, at the 
prior conference of the Central Java Provincial Party Committee, held 
on Augyst 10 and 11, it was proposed that Ali, together with Sartono 
and Suwirjo, be made "elder statesmen" (pinisepuh) of the party.22 
Then, in an about-face just prior to the elections at the congress 
itself, the majority of the Central Java branches, along with a few 
from West Sumatra, issued a statement which said that although they 
had previously considered nominating either Hardi, Hadisubeno, Wilopo 
or Sartono as party chairman, they now, "in the interest of party 
unity," urged Ali's reelection.23 24
The change of mind resulted from two factors . First, the Central 
Java Committee could not count on its usual support from the West 
Java branches because these were for the moment led by pro-Ali people. 
Thus, with votes from East Java, Djakarta, South Sumatra, Lampung, 
North Sumatra and some branches from Kalimantan and Sulawesi, Ali 
had a good chance of defeating the Central Java forces. Second, 
and more crucial, President Sukarno obviously opposed the Hardi 
forces. In his speech to the congress, Sukarno urged that the older 
party leaders give way to younger men. Although Hardi was much 
younger than Ali, Sartono, and others, Sukarno was careful to include 
him by name in the older group.21* The following day, pro-Ali branches 
sent a delegation to see Sukarno to determine and discuss the impli­
cations of his speech. Sukarno told them that he would not oppose 
Ali's reelection so long as the remaining leadership positions were
20. The phrase "working cabinet" is used to denote ministers who headed 
regular departments and excludes ministers without portfolio and 
parliamentary leaders with official ministerial rank.
21. Information on the Tenth Party Congress was taken from: Hardi,
Laporan Umum DPP-PNI; DPP-PNI, Keputusan-Keputusan Kongres ke-X 
PNl; Suhardjo "Lagu Marhaen Mendengung-Mendengung dari Kota 
Tempe Kripik," Berita Indonesia, September 5, 6, 9, 10, 1963;
Juti, "Beberapa Tjatatan dari Kongres di Purwokerto," Suluh 
Indonesia, September 7, 14, 1963.
22. Keputusan Konperensi PNI Seluruh Djawa Tengah (Mimeographed).
23. Pernjataan (Mimeographed: September 1, 1963).
24. Sukarno, "Marhaenisme Sebagai Dasar Tidak Pernah Berobah," in Dep. 
Penprop PNI, Shaping and Reshaping Indonesia (Djakarta: Pertjetakan 
Negara, 1964), pp. 77-93.
155
filled by younger leaders.25 This encouragement, combined with 
skillful manipulation of the congress schedule, resulted in Ali's 
reelection by acclamation, before the time actually set for the 
elections.
Later, five vice-chairmen, a secretary-general, his deputy and 
a treasurer were elected to form a nine-man working leadership 
(Dewan Harian). The elections for vice-chairmen were largely a 
matter of allocating the seats among the two competing factions while 
maintaining a semblance of geographic representation. Hardi (Central 
Java), Osa Maliki (West Java), Dr. Mohammad Isa (South Sumatra), Ruslan 
Abdulgani (East Java), and Subamia (Bali) were elected first to fifth 
vice-chairmen.
The main battle between the Ali and Hardi factions arose over 
the position of secretary-general. Their respective candidates were 
Surachman26 and Subagio Reksodipuro.27 Subagio Reksodipuro had been
25. Per Chandra Nainggolan who, along with Nj. Ani Idrus, went to 
see Sukarno. Personal interview, Semarang, June 2, 1969. It 
seems clear that Sukarno's attack on the older leaders was not 
based on the expectation that a younger man would take over the 
chairmanship but was rather intended to weaken Ali's position 
and force him to accept a rejuvenation of party leadership.
26. Surachman was born in Jogja on August 25, 1926. He received a 
degree in agricultural engineering from Gadjah Mada in 1961.
While a student he was active in the local Petani organization 
and the party, and he became a member of the Jogja regional legis­
lative council in 1957. In 1959, he was elected secretary-general 
of Petani and, in 1960, was a member of the Dewan Harian of the 
Front Nasional and of the Gotong-Rojong Parliament. In 1961 he 
was on the staff of the Komando Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi, and,
in 1965, was Minister of People's Irrigation. Riwajat Singkat 
Surachman, October 15, 1965 (Mimeographed); Departemen Penerangan 
and Gotong-Rojong Parliament Secretariat biographic files.
After the October 1, 1965 coup, Surachman was accused of beine a PKI infiltrator. Though one cannot know for sure, the evidence 
available does not support this conclusion. His extensive 
writings in the PNI paper Suluh Indonesia do not betray any trace 
of the PKI style of writing or thinking. His support of the 
Fifth Force idea and his ambivalence on aksi sepihak is under­
standable, since he was totally devoted to Sukarno whose position 
on these two issues was also ambivalent. Surachman's capture 
and subsequent death from wounds inflicted by an Army patrol in 
the South Malang-Blitar area in July 1968, an area where the PKI 
tried to set up a base for armed struggle, is not necessarily 
proof that he was a PKI member before 1965. He was a fugitive 
beginning in February 196§ and it would have been natural for him 
to join other fugitives, regardless of political affiliation. It 
would also have been logical for him to hide in the South Malang- 
Blitar area, where he had served during the revolution with the 
student army of East Java (TRIP).
27. Subagio was born in Bodjonegoro, East Java, on April 10, 1914 
but was associated with the West Java leadership group in the 
party. His education at the Batavia Law Faculty and his experi­
ence as a teacher at the Perguruan Rakjat in Djakarta gave him
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associated with the Hardi group in past party conflicts. He had a 
much longer experience in the national party leadership than Surachman, 
but was unpopular because of his reputation for aloofness. Surachman, 
at the time of the Congress, was secretary-general of Petani. He 
had a reputation as a quiet and hard-working young man. Although he 
had signed the Buku Merah in 1960, since then he had not been actively 
involved in intra-party conflicts. He was included as one of the 
young men Sukarno recommended for leadership and also in the Central 
Java Committee's list of prospective members for the National Party 
Council.28 This victory over Subagio Reksodipuro, by the narrow 
margin of two out of some 600 total votes, clinched the victory for 
the Ali faction. Ali, Surachman, Ruslan Abdulgani, and S. Hadikusumo 
(treasurer) later drew Dr. Isa and Subamia into their circle, leaving 
Hardi, Osa Maliki, and Isnaeni (deputy secretary-general) an isolated 
minority in the new nine-man Dewan Harian.
One of the reasons why the Hardi group did not oppose the Ali 
faction more vigorously was a growing fear of a major party split 
caused by continuing tension over the crisis in the KBKI. The Dewan 
Pimpinan Sentral KBKI (DPS-KBKI, Central Leadership Council) of the 
Datuk-Ahem faction seemed to be gaining the upper hand over the party- 
sponsored Dewan Pimpinan Pus at KBKI (DPP-KBKI Central Leadership 
Council), under Soerojo, in the campaign to capture the federation's 
provincial branches and member unions. The DPS-KBKI had refused to 
leave the party formally because it expected President Sukarno's sup­
port in a showdown at the Purwokerto Congress,29 an expectation that 
seemed justified when Ahem and Datuk turned up at the congress as 
members of President Sukarno's entourage.
Conditions within the party, however, resulted in the unexpected. 
Both Ahem and Datuk had been respected left-wing leaders of the PNI 
since the late 'fifties, but after the KBKI split in September 1962, 
they had supported the position that the ormas should be kept as in­
dependent as possible from the party. While left-wing elements had 
previously adopted this stance to prevent interference from the right- 
wing party leadership as they consolidated their own positions within 
the ormas, by the time of the Purwokerto Congress, the power and 
stake of the ormas in the party had improved to such an extent that 
the people who would once have been natural allies of Ahem and Datuk 
now abandoned them to promote party solidarity.
good contacts and similar attitudes with the Wilopo-Hardi group.
From 1950 to 1954, he was national chairman of the Pemuda 
Democrat Indonesia. He was a member of the National Party Council 
beginning in 1951 and a member of the Congress Working Committee 
from 1960 to 1963. He represented West Java in Parliament. 
Tokoh-Tokoh Parlemen, pp. 90-91; Suara Marhaenis, 7, no. 9 (May
TT, "195 7), p'. 17.
28. Keputusan Konperensi PNI Seluruh Djawa Tengah, August 10-11,
1963 (Mimeographed) .
29. "Laporan Singkat Sidang Paripurna DPS-KBKI," May 6-8, 1963, 
Djakarta (Typescript).
The need for unity between the party and its ormas formed the 
theme of the Chairman Ali Sastroamidjojo's opening speech to the 
congress.30 For the first time in the history of the party's con­
gresses, the chairman devoted a large segment of his speech to a 
survey of ormas activities. He outlined the steps that had been 
taken against the DPS-KBKI leadership and noted with satisfaction 
that younger KBKI leaders had assumed the task of regaining the fed­
eration's lost member unions and branches. The new ascendancy of 
younger, left-wing elements in the PNI was not only revealed by their 
success in the elections for the Dewan Harian but also in the changes 
which the congress accepted in the formulation of party ideology and 
in party organization.
Nationalism in Search of an Ideology
The PNI's official ideology has never embodied a coherent and 
comprehensive political philosophy. Ideological consistency has 
always been subordinated to the changing needs of the party.
Marhaenism (the official name for the party's ideology), as 
originally formulated by Sukarno and his associates in the late 
'twenties and early 'thirties, was a heterogeneous political doctrine 
which contained both radical and conservative elements within it. It 
was radical to the extent that it contained a critique of Dutch 
colonialism derived from the Leninist theory of imperialism and 
emphasized the inherent contradiction between the colonized peoples 
of the world and the established imperial powers. It was conserva­
tive to the extent that it rejected a Marxist class analysis of 
Indonesian society and, instead of the Marxist categories of workers 
and peasants, posited a generalized kaum Marhaen (common man) as the 
basis for its political action.
The main theme of Marhaenist doctrine was the need for national 
unity of all groups against the colonial power and the propagation 
of the ideas of socialism, nationalism and democracy in opposition 
to colonial capitalism, racism and repression. After independence, 
the inherent tension between the radical and conservative elements 
in Marhaenist doctrine, largely latent in the colonial period, be­
came increasingly manifest, as shown in the first formal statement 
of party ideology by the post-war PNI, issued after the Sixth Party 
Congress in 1952. The statement begins with a critique of Dutch 
colonialism which is radical in the classic vein, but when it turns 
to a discussion of post-independence Indonesian society, the conser­
vative element is only too evident.
The 1952 statement continues to use the concept of rakjat 
Marhaen in a completely holistic and undifferentiated way, lumping 
together the rural proletariat with propertied peasants; the unem­
ployed with government clerks; urban labor with small traders. Even 
the group categorized as the top nine percent of society31 escapes
30. Ali Sastroamidjo, Bulatkanlah Front Marhaenis dalam Ideologinja 
dan Organisasinja (Deppenprop DPP-PNI, pamphlet).
31. The statement divides post-colonial Indonesian society into:
2% at the top, who live comfortably; 71, who have enough; and
911 poor peasants, small traders, laborers, and lower government 
employees, who live in conditions of abject poverty. Pendjelasan 
Marhaenisme (DPP-PNI, 1952).
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identification as the enemy of the rest. In outlining the goals of 
peasant organizations, the statement evades the issue of land reform 
with an innocuous phrase and the will-o'-the-wisp of transmigration.
It denies any basic antagonism between labor and management by urging 
labor to produce more so that they will "deserve" increased wages. 
While it calls for organizational work among peasants, laborers, 
youth and women, it betrays its statist orientation in its emphasis 
on government-initiated reform rather than mass action.
To explain why PNI ideology in this period had not gone far be­
yond the pre-war PNI in terms of precision and clarity, the role of 
ideology in the life of the PNI must be understood. It was not a 
doctrine in which aspiring leaders had to verse themselves and by 
which they had to live, as in the case of the PKI; rather, it was a 
cluster of symbols used to legitimize a leadership whose qualifica­
tions were, in many cases, ascriptive status and generalized local 
influence. In other words, the ideology was designed to persuade the 
electorate of the high quality of party leadership rather than to 
mobilize them on the basis of their own grievances. The ideology 
also served practical electoral aims--the party praised everyone and 
attacked no one inside the Indonesian system, since it was seeking to 
attract as large an electoral coalition as possible, regardless of 
the inherent incompatability of the components of such a coalition.
By its ideology, the party was not making a political declaration of 
its future plans but rather searching for a common political denomina­
tor that would elevate it to and maintain it in power.
After the death of the election-based parliamentary system, the 
conditions for party competition changed, and the role of ideology 
in party life began to change also. Ideology now became a tool used 
to politicize and to mobilize the masses, not for occasional elections 
but on a permanent basis. But change did not come easily to many 
older party leaders. The new uses of ideology were foreign to their 
experience and their training.
Thus the change in PNI ideology paralleled the changing composi­
tion of the party leadership. During Suwirjo's chairmanship, from 
1956 to 1960, an attempt to elaborate on the 1952 formulation of 
party ideology failed, partly a result of severe disagreements over 
the issues raised by the transition to Guided Democracy. The first 
serious proponents of ideological renovation were the men who eventual 
ly formed Partindo in 1958. They wanted a more rigorous Marxist 
interpretation of Indonesian social and political reality.
After Partindo was formed, its criticisms of the PNI were taken 
up by elements in the PNI's ormas. The Buku Merah specifically con­
demned the influx of "liberal" and "bureaucratic" elements into the 
party leadership. The earliest and most consistent source of new 
ideas within the PNI was the party's university student organization, 
the GMNI. The GMNI was the most dynamic of the party's ormas and, 
by 1963, its cadres and former members had begun to establish a foot­
hold in the leadership of other ormas and the party's local committees 
As early as February 1959, the GMNI national conference at Kaliurang, 
Jogjakarta, approved a document called "Beberapa Thesis Pedoman Garis 
Perdjoangan" (Some Theses as Guidelines for Struggle), which estab­
lished ideological guidelines that were to culminate in the Deklarasi 
Marhaenis of November 1964. The GMNI statement contrasted with the 
older leadership's penchant for conciliatory fence-sitting:
In the revolution, we recognize two types of persons and
groups, a person or group that is actively for the
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revolution and a counter-revolutionary. The revolution 
does not recognize a dual personality, for commitment 
to the revolution is total and absolute. It does not 
recognize compromise, for it is compromise which ob­
structs and eventually causes the failure of the revolu­
tion .
Thus we must consciously and firmly separate the revolu­
tionary from the counter-revolutionary types. A politics 
of isolation, of separating counter-revolutionaries from 
the masses,is an absolute necessity.
The document then identified counter-revolutionary types as:
. . . Capitalists, landlords, compradors, federalists, 
“conservative-orthodox-doctrinaire-formalist" bureaucrats, 
opportunist and corrupt politicians and economic specu­
lators. The most important revolutionary element is 
labor youth. The revolutionaries also include poor 
peasants, members of the armed forces, and poor intel­
lectuals. Counter-revolutionary elements must be 
purged from the party. Although control over govern­
mental institutions is important, a major part of party 
energies must be devoted to work among the masses in 
order to prevent isolation from them. To do this, the 
party must seriously train cadres to lead the mass 
organizations.
The party as a whole was slow to accept these ideas; for example, the 
Ninth Party Congress in 1960 condemned the Buku Merah, and in January 
1962, the party prohibited its ormas from making statements on 
Marhaenism without prior consultation with the party.32
In response to the ideological challenges from within and from 
without, the party limited itself to reasserting the identity of 
Marhaenism with the ideology of Guided Democracy as formulated by 
President Sukarno, and giving Sukarno the title of "Father of 
Marhaenism" at the 1960 Congress.33 345 The official reformulation of 
Marhaenism, Dasar-Dasar Pokok Marhaenisme ,3tt emphasized the similar­
ities between Marhaenism, Pantja Sila, and the Political Manifesto 
of 1959. The first clear break came in July 1963, when Ali, at 
the 36th anniversary celebrations of the party, defined Marhaenism 
as "Marxism adapted to Indonesian conditions."55 Though often de­
rided by outsiders, this definition helped considerably in gaining 
the acceptance of ideas which would otherwise have been rejected 
out-of-hand as communist by the party's provincial following. The 
definition itself was formally accepted at the Tenth Party Congress
32. Instruction No. 048/Pol/003/'62, January 22, 1962.
33. Risalah Lengkap Kongres ke-IX PNI, July 25-29, 1960, Surakarta 
(Mime ographe d).
34. DPP-PNI, Dasar-Dasar Pokok Marhaenisme (Djakarta: Pertjetakan 
Suluh Indonesia, 1961).
35. Suluh Indonesia, July 3, 1963. Sukarno first used this defini­
tion m  1958.
160
in 1963. The new "Keterangan Azas dan Tudjuan PNI" approved by the 
Congress adopted the nine theses of the pre-war Partindo, focussing 
on the workers and peasants as the leading forces in the Marhaenist 
struggle. New themes in party propaganda and indoctrination re­
flected the changes. Speeches by party leaders during this time con­
verged on the need to "return to the masses" (kembali kepada Marhaen), 
to "unite the party and the ormas in a strong Marhaenist Front," and 
to "build the PNI into a vanguard party."
These developments culminated in the adoption of the Deklarasi 
Marhaenis at the Congress Working Committee meeting at Lembang 
(Bandung), in November 1964.36 The statement said:
There is no revolutionary movement which is not based on 
revolutionary theory. Marhaenism is a revolutionary 
theory based on mass action. As such, the conditions 
of the Marhaenist struggle must be revolutionary and 
grounded on a two-phase conception of the revolution.
The first is the national democratic phase and the 
second, the socialist phase. Because of this, the 
struggle must be led by the peasantry and labor.
The PNI/Front Marhaenis is an instrument of the revolu­
tion, based on workers and peasants, and led by the proper 
[tepat] elements. In order to achieve the victory of 
the masses [kaum Marhaen], they must be organized in a 
Marhaenist Front which is dynamic, militant, radical, 
disciplined and totally dedicated to the cause of the 
masses .
The PNI/Front Marhaenis must teach, guide, and prepare 
the masses for the daily struggle. It must become the 
vanguard leadership of the masses. In short, the PNI/
Front Marhaenis is the "concretization" of the Marhaenist 
ideology formulated by Bung Kamo as the avant-garde of 
the struggle of the Marhaenist masses.
We believe that without revolutionary mass action by the 
Marhaen masses there will never be a social transformation 
that will reach the upper levels of society.
The rhetoric of the Deklarasi Marhaenis was not simply a tactical 
response to the ideological climate of Guided Democracy; it signalled 
real changes in party attitudes toward basic issues. Whereas previously 
the PNI had tended to blame the Dutch for most of the country’s ills, 
the party now began to identify domestic conditions and groups which 
in its view facilitated imperialist intrusion. With the acceptance 
of Marxist formulas, the party began to move away from the middle- 
ground, to identify its friends and its enemies. As a result, the 
PNI began to take its ormas increasingly seriously and to direct 
more of its efforts towards mass action.
Some have ascribed the ideological change in the PNI to Sukarno’s 
influence or to PKI infiltration, and, no doubt, the new PNI ideologi­
cal language closely followed the pattern set earlier by Sukarno and
36. PNI Penegak Pantja Sila (Djakarta: Deppenprop, DPP-PNI, 1965),
pp. 2-8.
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the PKI. But more important, Sukarnofs Guided Democracy and the 
PKIfs successes had forced changes in the framework of party com­
petition. By indefinitely postponing elections and encouraging the 
growth of ormas,Sukarno facilitated the entry of new, young leaders 
into the PNI. These new leaders from the party’s ormas had skills 
which suited them to the Guided Democracy political world. As a 
rule, their class position was only slightly below that of the older 
party leaders. But in the Indonesia of the late ’fifties and early 
’sixties, when social position and its perquisites were constantly 
threatened by a declining economy and an increasingly radical at­
mosphere, their lives must have seemed much less secure than had 
those of previous generations. Moreover, the good positions in the 
bureaucracy, imperative for elite status in Indonesia, were in in­
creasingly short supply. For the politically conscious young man in 
the ’sixties, the continuing deterioration of the economy and the 
obvious failure of the older national leadership to fulfill the 
promises of the revolution provided sufficient motivation to search 
for new ideological formulas.
The PNI and Land Reform
The PNI’s differing roles in the three major issues of the 
later Guided Democracy period--economic policy, Confrontation and 
land reform--illustrate its position in the politics of that time.
The formulation and implementation of Confrontation and economic 
policies were concentrated in Djakarta, where Sukarno and the Army 
were the dominant political actors. These two issue-areas were also 
those which, because of their international repercussions, attracted 
the attention of foreign observers. Land reform, however, was not 
only an issue of prime interest to a majority of the Indonesian 
people, but one which had to be worked out concretely outside 
Djakarta in the rural areas. It is precisely in provincial politics 
that the limitations of studies of Indonesian politics which focus 
on the Sukarno-Army-PKI triangle are most conspicuous.
Land reform, as with many other Guided Democracy issues, was an 
amalgam of radical rhetoric and conservative reality. The Land Re­
form Law (Law Number 5/1960), which replaced the old Netherlands 
East Indies Law of 1870, was proclaimed on September 24, 1960. Un­
like much of the legislation during Guided Democracy, the Land 
Reform Law resulted from extensive discussion, first in the Supreme 
Advisory Council (DPA) and later in the Gotong-Rojong Parliament. 
These discussions produced a compromise between PKI-led forces, which 
wanted rigorous land reform based on the principle of ’’land to the 
tiller,” and their opponents, led by the religious groups, who argued 
that proprietary rights in land are inalienable according to Indone­
sian traditional law. Sadjarwo, the PNI Minister of Agriculture 
and Petani second vice-chairman, proposed a compromise based on a 
minimum and maximum amount of hectarage allowed per family.37 This 
draft was eventually accepted.
In December 1960 , Emergency Law 56/’60 proclaimed the govern­
ment’s obligation ”to endeavor to provide every peasant family with
37. The main outlines of this draft were approved at the Petani 
Working Congress meeting in April 1960 at Bogor. Suluh 
Indonesia, April 20, 1960.
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a minimum of two hectares of arable land," and to set maximum limits 
on private land based on population density. In Java and Bali, the 
maximum for irrigated land was set at five hectares and for dry 
land at nine hectares per family. The law excluded land owned by 
religious institutions and communal land allocated for use by village 
functionaries. It offered many loopholes for landlords. Large land- 
holdings were divided among members of extended families or hidden 
in the land registers as mosque, religious school or temple land.
The local land reform committees themselves were often dominated by 
landlords and. their sympathizers.38
The PNI was in a strong position to influence the success or 
failure of the land reform program, since Sadjarwo's position as 
Minister of Agriculture and PNI domination of local governments in 
Java and^Bali gave it a powerful say in the composition and activ­
ities of" local land reform committees. The party was deeply divided 
on how this position was to be utilized. The issue very rapidly 
showed how much power right-wing provincial leaders retained in 
spite of left-wing dominance at the center.
In the first instance, the initiative lay with the provincial 
leadership. In Central Java, East Java and Bali, where the PNI 
had many members and supporters among the land-owning groups, local 
party committees used their influence to help landlords circumvent 
the law. On the other hand, in Djakarta, the younger leadership of 
Petani and the party joined in.the mounting criticism of the progress 
of the land reform program. As early as September 1962, the 
secretary-general of Petani, and later of the party, Surachman, 
urged that farmers take their own steps to implement land reform be­
cause its opponents were still too strong.39 401 In 1964, he began to 
affirm the principle of "land to the tiller" in his writings and 
speeches and to attack local land reform personnel for their apathy 
and their collusion with the landlords. To assist the implementa­
tion of the program, he urged that village government be "democratized" 
and that tanah bengkok (communal land allocated for use of the vil­
lage headmen) be abolished0 At the Central Party Council meeting 
on February 8, 1964, Mohammad Djambek complained that, in several 
places, land was not being divided among landless peasants but in­
stead among friends and relatives of the land reform committee mem­
bers.1*1 The resulting tension between the PNI's young leaders at 
the Central Party Headquarters and the local party leadership was 
further exacerbated in 1964 and 1965 by the increasing incidence of 
aksi sepihak (unilateral actions) in the countryside.
The aksi sepihak was a logical outcome of the discrepancy between 
the radical rhetoric and the conservative reality of land reform.
The rhetoric had raised expectations among Indonesia's landless
38. Much of the preceding discussion is based on E. Utrecht, "Land 
Reform in Indonesia," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 
5, no. 3 (November 1969), pp. 71-88.
39. Surachman, "Nasib Kaum Tani Tergantung pada Kaum Tani Sendiri," 
Suluh Indonesia, September 9, 1962.
40. Suluh Indonesia, January 1, 22, 1964.
41. "Minutes of the meeting" (Typescript).
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peasants--expectations soon confounded by the reality of slow and 
corrupt land reform committees. Encouraged and often led by the 
Communist Barisan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasant League, BTI) , 
bands of landless peasants began to take matters into their own 
hands. They forcibly occupied disputed lands or else refused to 
turn the harvest over to landlords or creditors. In response, land­
lords and rich peasants formed their own armed bands and turned to 
the PNI or NU for help. In the resulting clashes, police and army 
units often sided with the landlords.
The aski sepihak took place primarily in Central Java, East 
Java and Bali, and provoked a violent anti-Communist response from 
local PNI leadership. In Central Java, the provincial leadership 
used the aksi sepihak issue to attack the PKI with increasing open­
ness. While consciously defending the landlords, they also accused 
the PKI of using aksi sepihak as a way to discredit PNI lurah (village 
headmen) and draw away Petani membership. At an emergency conference 
of the Central Java branches in late October 1964, the provincial 
leadership instructed all party branches and ormas to issue public 
statements attacking aksi sepihak and to cooperate with the police 
and the army in suppressing it.1+2 In April 1965 , this campaign cul­
minated in the publication and wide distribution of a pamphlet, popu­
larly known as the Buku Putih (White Book), the most violent public 
attack on the PKI during this period.42 3 45
In East Java, where the NU was strong, the PNI often cooperated 
with it against the PKI. In Banjuwangi, the PNI and NU worked to­
gether to oust the bupati . whom they accused of continually favoring 
the BTI in land disputes. 4 In Kediri, after a series of clashes, 
the PNI and NU branches issued a joint statement urging the govern­
ment to take firm steps against the organizers of aksi sepihak, and 
stating that if such steps were not immediately taken, neither party 
would consider itself responsible for any future ”incidents .1,45
In Bali, the PNI was increasingly challenged by a small but 
active PKI organization and a governor known to be sympathetic to 
the Communists. PNI control over local administration proved of no 
avail with a governor apt to cancel the decisions of pro-PNI local 
administrators. By late 1964, the confrontation between the two 
parties over the land problem was so tense that armed clashes had be­
come a frequent occurrence.46
42. ’’Kesatuan Gerak Menghadapi Kaum Munafik Kepala Batu," Decision of 
the Emergency Conference, Central Java Provincial Committee, 
October 24- 25 , 1§64 (Mimeographed).
43. DPD-PNI Djawa Tengah, Adjakan PNI-Front Marhaenis Djawa Tengah.
44. Pendjelasan Umum NU-PNI Sekitar Latar Belakang Politik Penolakan 
Soewarso Kanapi SH (Mimeographed, January 28 , 1965) ; Suluh
Indonesia, January 8 , 1965.
45. Pernjataan Bersama PNI dan NU (Mimeographed, February 23, 1965); 
Pernjataan Bersama PNI dan NU (Mimeographed, April 21, 1965).
46. DPD-Daerah Bali, Ketegangan-Kegawatan-Kekatjauan Akibat Ketiadaan 
Kepemimpinan Gub./KDH Bali, A. A. Bagus Sutedja (Mimeographed).
In most cases, the PNI sided with the landowner against the 
tenant, who was supported by the PKI, though it was claimed that
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The virulence of the PNI provincial organizations1 attacks on 
the PKI embarrassed the partyTs national leadership. The Central 
Headquarters had publicly opposed aksi sepihak because it "threaten­
ed Nasakom unity" and "weakened the revolutionary forces," but the 
provincial PNI committees had gone beyond attacking aksi sepihak and 
had launched a more generalized offensive against the PKI. This 
opened the party to charges of "Komunisto-phobie" and endangered its 
campaign to improve relations with President Sukarno. Beyond immedi­
ate considerations of tactics, however, genuine confusion existed in 
the ranks of the PNI national leadership about how to deal with the 
aksi sepihak issue. The younger leaders, frustrated by the short­
comings of the land reform machinery, had joined with the PKI in 
demanding representation for peasant organizations on the land re­
form committees and courts set up in 1964. But they also felt that 
the PKI had gone too far in pushing aksi sepihak, that it was using 
peasant frustration as an instrument against the PNI, and that it 
was undermining Nasakom solidarity.1*7 The party newspaper, Suluh 
Indonesia , stated in an editorial on June 17: "Maybe aksi sepihak
will benefit peasants in a few places temporarily. But it is ques­
tionable whether it will benefit our revolution in the long run."
In June 1964, the government prohibited aksi sepihak and ban­
ned all polemic on it. In December, it forced all political 
parties to issue a declaration that they would refrain from divi­
sive and tension-creating activities. But neither measure stemmed 
the tide of conflict in the countryside that aksi sepihak had pro­
voked. The national PKI leadership itself could not control the 
BTI and its rural cadres. In the PNI, the continuing provincial 
attacks on the PKI were eventually to precipitate a purge of the 
Central Java leadership in May 1965 and a national purge the fol­
lowing August.
The PNI and the PKI
The PNI has always had ambivalent feelings toward the PKI. The 
Communist Party has been, all at once, villain and hero, enemy and 
sage--to be feared, yet also to be emulated. It has been seen as 
a threat to PNI interests and, at the same time, an ally against 
common enemies.
The PNI, as the main representative of Indonesia's post-colonial 
elite, had much to fear from the PKI. By using class antagonisms 
and economic conflict as a basis for organizing among the masses, 
the PKI threatened to break the traditional hold which the provin­
cial prijaji had over the peasantry and through which the PNI had 
built up its electoral following. But at the same time, as a 
secular and a Javanese party, the PKI represented a natural ally 
against the Masjumi and its Islamic and outer island backers. The 47
the landowner was a poor man himself. Also, DPD Bali report 
to the PNI National Chairman, May 29, 1965, No. 347/Sekr/DPD/ 
f 6 5 .
47. Surachman, Laporan Tahunan DPP-PNI Kepada Sidang BPK-PNI di 
Lembang, November 15-18, 1964 (Mimeographed).
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PKI also opposed retention of the economic, administrative and polit­
ical structures left behind by the Dutch. On this issue, for a while 
at least, the PNI saw the PKI as a useful tool against groups such 
as the PSI.
In the early ’fifties, the Sidik leadership had maintained a 
parliamentary alliance with the PKI against the Masjumi and the PSI, 
but the party leadership had envisaged this as an alliance of con­
venience. As long as the PKI supported the PNI in pushing radical 
nationalist issues, "There is no need at this time, to consider the 
PKI an enemy."1*8 Given PKI weakness at the time, the PNI leadership 
believed it could use the PKI politically without much danger of being 
used in return.
When the PKI won the 1957 provincial elections in Java, all the 
latent PNI hostility against it surfaced. Stung by the realization 
that PKI electoral gains had been made at the expense of the PNI, 
the party leadership in several provinces urged that PNI cooperation 
with the PKI at the capital be terminated. Though the Central Head­
quarters denied any change in policy, it, in fact, decided in August 
1957 to withdraw Sidik’s September 1953 instruction on cultivating 
good relations with the PKI in local areas.1*9
In many places in Java, the PNI now actively sought alliances 
with the Masjumi and the NU against the PKI. In Djakarta politics, 
however, this was not possible-- the Masjumi national leadership was 
discredited by its involvement in the PRRI rebellion, and Sukarno 
came increasingly to the defense of the PKI. At a time when politi­
cal parties were under attack and Sukarno’s power was increasing, 
the PNI could ill afford to displease him by openly attacking the 
Communists. This factor in PKI-PNI relations was especially evident 
during the so-called "Peristiwa Tiga Selatan" (Three Souths Affair) 
in 1960, when, contrary to the President’s wishes, the military 
commanders of South Sumatra, South Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi 
prohibited any PKI activities in their provinces. In both South 
Sumatra and South Kalimantan, the PNI provincial committees issued 
statements strongly supporting the ban.48 950 Soon after, the Central 
Party Headquarters sent out an instruction to both provincial party 
committees ordering them to "neutralize" their statements of sup­
port and to leave the matter up to Central Headquarters. The letter 
said that the Central Headquarters " understood the reasons for 
their support of the ban," but urged them to ". . . look at the problem
48. "Pendjelasan Instruksi Rahasia," October 5, 1953. On September 
8, Sidik had sent an instruction urging local branches to culti­
vate good relations with the PKI. When this secret instruction 
was leaked by the opposition press, Sidik sent the October 5 
explanation.
49. "Keputusan Dewan Pimpinan Pusat," No. 15/Pol/1957, August 5, 1957.
50. "Pernjataan Dewan Daerah PNI Kalimantan Selatan," No. 1/DD-PNI/ 
’60, August 24, 1960. In South Sumatra, the PNI provincial 
leadership sent a telegram to the local military commander, on 
August 29, supporting the ban. On September 2, it was forced 
into the embarrassing situation of having to withdraw this sup­
port. Press Release, DPD-PNI Sumatra Selatan (Mimeographed).
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from a wider perspective. What we mean, among other things, is 
that we must ensure good relations between the Bapak Marhaenis 
[Sukarno] and the party leadership for the future good of our 
struggle.”51 A subsequent letter said that the party should be 
neither for nor against the ban but should ’’profit from silence.”52
In the early ’fifties, the PNI-PKI relationship had worked 
largely in the PNI’s favor. The weakness and vulnerability of the 
PKI at that time made it easy even for staunch anti-Communists 
within the PNI to sanction a limited form of cooperation. The change 
in PNI leadership in 1956 and the disastrous PNI losses in the 1957 
elections destroyed the basis of this relationship. The period from 
1956 to 1960 was therefore characterized by sharp hostility between 
the two parties.
The antagonism towards the PKI began to change in the early 
’sixties under the impetus of Guided Democracy political arrange­
ments. In the new situation, the PNI had much to learn from the 
PKI. Ali Sastroamid j o j o said in 1960: ’’The PNI should not have
a Communist-phobia. We should admit that the PKI in fact has a 
considerable mass following. Our attitude should be one of com­
petition with them, especially in gaining the support of the 
masses.”53 It was in the performance of these new tasks that the 
younger leadership of the PNI excelled, and they began to reorient 
the party ideologically and organizationally toward competition 
with the PKI.
Party competition accelerated with the end of martial law in 
1963, as the parties, after years of restricted activity, again de­
manded a voice in government affairs. Since government activity 
itself was rapidly expanding into more areas of social life through 
mass mobilization for the Irian and Confrontation campaigns, land 
reform, and the purchase and distribution of staples (such as fuel, 
sugar and rice), party rivalry expressed itself in these arenas 
too. Both parties played active roles in the welter of bodies set 
up to supervise these government programs and to direct campaigns 
against a variety of groups and organizations charged with being 
anti-regime.
The PKI certainly outweighed the PNI in this competition. Its 
international connections put it in a better position to influence 
foreign policy as Sukarno moved closer to an alliance with Communist 
powers. Its more coherent ideology enabled it to identify and push 
political issues consistently, and it had a better command of the 
techniques of mass agitation. But Western commentators often as­
cribed more power and political prowess to the PKI than it deserved. 
It can, and has been argued,54 that as the PKI gained more and more
51. Letter from Central Headquarters to the South Kalimantan provincial 
committee, No. 029/Pol/004/’60, August 30 , 1960.
52. Letter from Central Headquarters to all provincial committees and 
the national leadership of the party ormas, No. 037/Pol/007/’60, 
September 1, 1960.
53. Risalah Badan Pekerdja Kongres PNI (Mimeographed, July 1960).
54. Donald Hindley, ’’President Sukarno and the Communists: The
Politics of Domestication,” American Political Science Review, 56, 
no. 4 (December 1962), pp. 915-926.
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legitimacy in the last years of Guided Democracy, it also began to 
lose some of its organizational and ideological dynamism. As more 
party members and sympathizers gained positions of power, they began 
to take on the qualities of bureaucratic conservatism. In order to 
defend its position in the capital, the PKI had to tone down the 
activism of its rural cadres. In having to adjust to the demands of 
Nasakom solidarity, it had to sacrifice some of the political cutting- 
edge of its ideology.
The PNI<did not have to make such adjustments. Having accepted 
President Sukarno as the formulator of Marhaenism, the party could 
claim automatic congruence between its ideology and that of the 
state. In the drive to introduce Nasakom representation in govern­
ment institutions, the PNI could continue to claim a centrist posi­
tion between the ’’right” (Islam) and the ’’left” (Communism), attrac­
ting thereby the elements unwilling to take a position at either 
extreme. The PNI put these advantages to good use in its competi­
tion with the PKI. After 1963, the party’s organizational activities 
were premised on the conception of the PNI as the partai pelopor 
(vanguard party). The PNI did not aspire to become a state party, 
and it opposed any fusion of the three Nasakom parties. But the 
concept served to define the PNI’s relationship with the PKI at a 
time when the PNI was approaching the PKI ideologically and organi­
zationally and therefore needed a device to differentiate itself.
In the party leadership’s view, the PNI had to assert its leadership 
in ideology and mass action. The identity between Marhaenism and 
Guided Democracy ideology was in its favor, but this advantage by 
itself was not enough. The PNl still had to increase its capacity 
to compete with the PKI in mass action. In the words of a special 
committee report:
Communist ideology threatens [Marhaenism] because of its 
militancy and its tactic of posing as the most vigilant 
fighter for the goals of our national revolution. In 
this connection, it can be said that the PKI has been 
successful because it is militant and skillful in adjust­
ing its tactics to the policy and revolutionary moves 
of the Great Leader of the Revolution, Bung Karno.55
To compete with the PKI in mass action, the PNI made concerted 
efforts to improve its own mass organizations, especially its labor 
federation, KBM, and its peasant organization, Petani. It also set 
up new front organizations among intellectuals, high school students, 
and other groups, paralleling comparable PKI front organizations.
When the PKI had huge mass rallies to celebrate its 45th anniversary 
in May 1965, the PNI countered with its own lavish celebrations in 
July. Fearing the PKI’s presumed close relations with Sukarno, a 
campaign began for greater PNI access to the Palace.
55. A five-man special committee on the PKI was formed at the Central 
Leadership Council meeting of September 26, 1964. Its report, 
Usui Untuk Menegakkan PNI Sebagai Partai Pelopor (Mimeographed), 
was submitted to the Congress Working Committee meeting at 
Lembang in November 1964.
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The PNI and Sukarno
In spite of the fact that the pre-war PNI was founded by Sukarno 
and that the post-war PNI has always regarded him as the father of 
its ideology as well as of the nation, the PNITs relationship with 
the President throughout the post-independence period, up to his 
death, has been characterized by considerable antagonism as well as 
deep affection. At various times the party has worked closely with 
Sukarno, and at others it has been in scarcely-veiled opposition to 
him.
Throughout most of the revolution the PNI was in the opposition, 
while Sukarno generally cooperated closely with whatever government 
was in power. It was not until Sukarno asserted a radical national­
ist position on such issues as the recovery of Irian from the Dutch 
that his relations with the party became really intimate. The in­
creasing congruence of political views between Sukarno and the PNI 
national leadership was buttressed by the close personal relation­
ship between the party chairman, Sidik Djojosukarto, and the President. 
In the conflicts between the Sidik and Wilopo groups in the early 
’fifties, Sukarno used his influence to swing certain older PNI 
leaders, who were personal friends, to the Sidik side. In the elec­
tions of 1955, the PNI openly used and clearly benefited from its 
association with Sukarno.
During the period of Suwirjo’s chairmanship, however, PNI rela­
tions with Sukarno took a turn for the worse. Sidik had died and a 
new, right-wing party leadership had been elected. The PNI’s half­
hearted response to his advocacy of PKI representation in the 
cabinet angered Sukarno and provoked him to attack the party. In 
his speech at the thirtieth anniversary celebrations of the PNI, 
Sukarno compared the current party unfavorably to its 1927 precursor 
and denied that it had a monopoly on Marhaenism.56 He continued the 
ideological attack in 1958 by supporting Partindo’s definition of 
Marhaenism. He also selected PNI members known to disagree with the 
party leadership for cabinet positions.
After the election in 1960 of a new leadership group more amen­
able to Sukarno’s political initiative, relations improved again. 
Sukarno disliked both Ali and Hardi, the two most important leaders 
of the party between 1960 and 1963, and criticized the older PNI 
leaders in general on most policy matters, but, aside from the issue 
of the KBKI split, there was little disagreement.
The conferring of the title Bapak Marhaenisme on Sukarno in 
1960, and the subsequent revisions in PNI ideology, culminating in 
the Deklarasi Marhaenis in 1964, certainly helped improve relations, 
as did the gradual replacement of the older party leaders with the 
more radical younger ones. Sukarno’s approval of these changes was 
made clear when, for the first time in the ’sixties, he appointed a 
major PNI leader to a responsible ministerial position--secretary- 
general Surachman was made Minister of People’s Irrigation in May 
1965. Within the party, too, changes in the conception of the rela­
tionship with the President facilitated a rapprochement. Whereas 
the older party leaders tended to see the connection with Sukarno 
in familial terms, and automatically expected special consideration
56. Suluh Indonesia, July 4, 5, 1957.
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from the Bapak Marhaenisme, the younger leaders knew that no real 
improvement could come unless the party approached the President 
from a position of strength.
They were much more aware of Sukarno as a competitor for power. 
Realizing Sukarno!s admiration for the young leadership and organi­
zational skills of the PKI, the PNI began to compete with the PKI 
on these grounds too. While the older leadership would warn Sukarno 
of the danger the PKI presented to his position, the younger men 
acknowledged the PKI's skills and sought to improve the PNI?s own 
capability for engaging in the kind of political activities that 
Sukarno appreciated. After 1963, these younger men gained closer 
access to Sukarno than any PNI leaders since Sidik. In April 1964, 
for example, a group of 26 young party leaders met with Sukarno at 
the Palace to discuss party developments.57 Sukarno challenged 
them to^  build the PNI into a vanguard party, and, at their request, 
agreed to give two speeches at a party cadre training program in 
March 1965. When, under their leadership, the party successfully 
held a huge anniversary celebration in July 1965, Sukarno indicated 
that he was surprised and impressed.58
In spite of these successes, the younger leaders did not profit 
as much as might have been expected from their new intimacy with 
Sukarno. Though Sukarno was impressed by mass parties and pushed 
the PNI to become one, he continued to select his closest assistants 
in the cabinet on the basis of personal likes and dislikes, regard­
less of their organizational backing, and sometimes of their ideology 
Within the PNI, he often intervened in ways which hindered the party 
from becoming a radical mass organization. At the PNI congress in 
1956, for example, he supported the weak and conservative Suwirjo 
against the more radical Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro, simply because he 
disliked Sarmidi and regarded Suwirjo as an old friend. In addi­
tion, by pushing the younger leaders to start the purge of the 
right-wing PNI leaders in mid-1965, a full six months before the 
time scheduled in the three-year work program of the Deklarasi 
Marhaenis, Sukarno forced them to make mistakes that might other­
wise have been avoided.
The PNI and the Armed Forces
Surprisingly little attention was given to the Army in PNI inter 
nal documents during the years 1963 to 1965, which indicates that
57. A small group of KBM leaders had gone to see Sukarno to ask for 
his blessing on the change from KBKI to KBM, and he had asked 
them if there were similar young leaders in other PNI ormas. As 
result the group of 26 leaders went to the Palace to discuss 
developments in the party. Suluh Indonesia, April 16, 1964.
58. When Sukarno was asked to address the mass meeting that was to
be the focal point of the celebrations, he had expressed doubts 
about the partyTs ability to fill Djakartafs 100,000-seat stadium 
He said that he would refuse to speak if the stadium were not 
full. When he came and saw an overflowing crowd, the first 
words of his speech were: ”Bukan main!” (roughly, "I don't
believe it!”). Interview with Ali Sastroamidjojo, January 10, 
1969; Suluh Indonesia, July 26, 1965.
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the party directed primary concern during those years to its competi­
tion with the PKI and improvement of relations with Sukarno. On a 
deeper level, it reflects the PNI leadership's statist orientation.
For the PNI, the armed forces, as an instrument of the state, should 
be free from partisan politics. The PNI's inability to recognize 
the armed forces as institutions with political interests limited 
the party's relations with them; whereas other political parties, 
such as the PKI and the PSI, mindful of the Army's increasing politi­
cal power, made efforts to infiltrate the officer corps and to exert 
influence on the formulation of its political role.
The PNI position on the October 17 Affair was consistent with its 
belief that the Army should be a loyal instrument of the state. The 
Sidik leadership supported officers such as Warouw, Kretarto, and 
Sudirman against their superiors because the latter backed the General 
Staff "in its illegal attempt to cow Parliament. Again, during 
the PRRI-Permesta rebellion, the PNI upheld Nasution and the General 
Staff against the regional commanders in Sumatra and Sulawesi because 
the latter were undermining the authority of the state.
It was their inability to see the direct challenge the army 
posed to civilian political interests which, among other factors, 
prompted PNI leaders to agree to the declaration of martial law in 
1957. At that time, the move seemed sensible because it gave the 
General Staff more power against dissident regionalist commanders.
In the next few years, as the Army moved with Sukarno against the 
parliamentary system and the political parties, the PNI slowly real­
ized the mistake that it had made.
From 1957 to 1963, the main victims of growing Army power were 
the right-wing leaders of the party. It was they who became the 
main target of such Army moves as the anti-corruption campaign of 
1957 and the prohibition of party membership for senior civil ser­
vants. The Army's wider campaign to restrict the activities and 
undermine the prestige of the political parties also weakened these 
leaders' position within the PNI. Though the KBKI led the take-over 
of Dutch enterprises in 1957, it was not the PNI but the Army that 
profited most from their subsequent operation as government enter­
prises. In many areas, the Army also took advantage of martial law 
to oust the PNI from control over the distribution of basic pro­
ducts, control which it derived from its position in the government.59
Other Army moves also weakened the Suwirjo group indirectly by 
strengthening the young leaders of the PNI ormas. The Badan Kerdja 
Sama set up by the Army at this time provided new financial and 
patronage resources to the younger groups which helped them eventu­
ally to topple the Suwirjo leadership. Thus, between 1958 and 1963, 
the leftist group in the PNI tended to see the Army as an ally.60 *
59. A letter of the first vice-chairman of the PNI in Bali to the PDI 
branch in Badung explained how the Army took over control, from 
the PNI, of the distribution of fuel oil, gasoline, coffee and 
hogs after the declaration of martial law. Letter No. 328/Pol/ 
1958, December 23, 1958.
60. Beberapa Thesis Pedoman Garis Perdjoangan (Mimeographed, February
15, 1959). This singles out the armed forces as one of the
"progressive-revolutionary" elements.
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It was only after the end of martial law in 1963, that they 
began to realize that the Army was an obstacle to their efforts to 
give the party a more active political role. Together with the 
PKI, the PNI left-wing began to attack the Army-sponsored federa­
tion of company unions, SOKSI (Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Seluruh 
Indonesia), and the Army-dominated management of the state enter­
prises. In January 1965, Surachman publicly supported PKI Chairman 
Aiditfs proposal to set up a Fifth Force (people's militia), arming 
labor and peasant elements.61 Columnists in the party newspaper 
also supported the proposal.62
This was going too far for many in the party leadership who, in 
the face of an increasingly strong and assertive PKI, were unwilling 
to alienate the Army unnecessarily. Surachman was reprimanded for 
his public support of the Fifth Force idea.63 In June, Ali 
Sastroakidjojo said that though the PNI did not oppose the creation 
of a Fifth Force, it should be carried out in the context of the 
MPRS-approved doctrine of total defense. Rather than arming only 
labor and peasant elements, a wider popular militia should be set 
up.64 In the same month, after a meeting between Ali, Surachman, 
and Ruslan Abdulgani, and Generals Yani, Harjono, and Sukendro, an 
agreement was reached whereby the PNI toned down its attacks on 
SOKSI in exchange for financial assistance for the lavish PNI anni­
versary celebrations the following month. But even though the 
party leadership granted concessions to the Army on the SOKSI issue, 
it refused to cooperate with the Army in a generalized attack on 
the PKI.65
Changes in Party Organization
One ironic result of Guided Democracy, which was built on the 
wreck of the party-dominated parliamentary system, was the improve­
ment of PNI party organization. In the period from 1960 to 1965, 
Indonesian political parties, in particular the PNI and the PKI,
61. Gelora Indonesia, January 19, 1965.
62. Diditi in Suluh Indonesia, June 12, 1965.
63. Interview with Ali Sastroamidjojo, September 5, 1969.
64. Suluh Indonesia, June 25, 1965. General Yani used the same
rationale to sidestep the issue. A two-part article by Suwardi 
in Suluh Indonesia, June 26, 29, 1965, elaborates the PNI
position.
65. The meeting was called ostensibly to discuss the "Peristiwa 
Kalasan,” in which PNI activists had been beaten up by soldiers 
from the Jogja garrison. Ali told Gen. Yani that the conflict 
arose because the garrison had been infiltrated by anti-PNI ele­
ments from the PKI. Yani proposed that the PNI join the Army in 
a long-range campaign against the PKI, but Ali says he refused. 
Interview with Ali, February 18, 1969. Ruslan Abdulgani con­
firmed this in an interview on November 17, 1969.
Later a letter of instruction from KBM Central Headquarters 
was circulated to the member unions emphasizing the temporary 
nature of the agreement with the Army. Isnaeni, Menj ingkap 
Tabir Kepalsuan (September 1, 1965), p. 30.
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actively organized more and more sectors of the population in their 
respective ormas, increased discipline and coordination among party 
units and between party and mass organizations, and recruited younger 
and more dynamic leaders. Though unsuccessful in their attempts to 
influence major government decisions, in the larger context of the 
developing Indonesian political system, political parties in the 
Tsixties increased their capacity for the political mobilization of 
the Indonesian masses, for articulating their needs and demands, 
and for bridging the gap between the government's modern and urban 
concerns and the rural and tradition-bound peasant majority.
Although,as early as 1951, the PNI already had organizations 
for youth, women and the peasantry, these possessed no great im­
portance in the party's life until the 'sixties. The early leader­
ship believed that party members should participate in and even 
lead existing organizations but, in contrast to PKI strategy, made 
no concerted effort to exercise day-to-day control over them.
The early development of the party youth organization, Pemuda 
Demokrat Indonesia (founded in 1947), and of the women's organization, 
Wanita Demokrat Indonesia (founded in 1951), reflected the party's 
social character. Since the party was primarily composed of national 
and provincial notables, these two ormas were in the first instance 
designed to accommodate the party members' sons and wives. Accord­
ingly, neither had any independent political significance; both had 
primarily a social character.
The PNI peasant organization, Petani, founded on August 28,
1948 in Kediri, East Java, was led in its early years mainly by 
officials from the Ministry of Agriculture. Its program was an in­
nocuous blend of proposals for the improvement of agricultural tech­
niques and the passage of a "just" Basic Agrarian Law.66
Although formally established at the time of the Sixth Party 
Congress in December 1952, the PNI labor federation (KBKI) had only 
a small following until after 1954, when splinter groups from the 
PKI-dominated organization of plantation workers, Sarbupri, joined 
it. In the next few years, it rapidly expanded from its original 
bases of support in West Java and North Sumatra. In contrast to 
Petani, the KBKI had experienced, full-time labor organizers in its 
national leadership. Though behind the PKI federation (SOBSI), it 
could still claim to be the second largest federation in the country 
only a few years after its establishment.
The election campaign made the PNI pay increased attention to 
its ormas. On February 16, 1953, the party and the WDI, PDI, Petani 
and KBKI issued joint instructions to their local units to coordin­
ate efforts for the election campaign.67 Before this time, these 
organizations were generally left alone by the party, and whatever 
coordination existed was ad hoc and depended on the efforts of 
particular individuals. In October 1953, a special committee of 
the National Party Council was formed to investigate party relations
66. Program Petani, approved at the Third Petani Congress in Malang 
on December 1-4, 1952 (Mimeographed).
67. Berita KBKI, 1, no. 9 (November 15, 1953), p. 13.
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with these organizations.68 But its main proposal for the creation 
of a coordination bureau (Biro Organisasi Marhaen) was never imple­
mented, for the elections rather than creating new patterns of co­
ordination only created new problems. There were complaints that 
the party used the ormas without sharing the political spoils. The 
most glaring example of these tensions occurred in late 1956, when 
Asnawi Said, who had been PDI national chairman from 1954 to 1956, 
and Nj. Kumpul, first vice-chairman of the WDI, were both expelled 
from the party for refusing to relinquish their seats in the Con­
stituent Assembly to party candidates.69
As part of the general reorganization plan under the new 
Suwirjo leadership, two sets of rules governing party-ormas rela­
tions were passed in 1957. These rules provided conditions for 
party recognition of new organizations, for coordination of posi­
tions oil political issues, for a common formulation of Marhaenism, 
and for resolution of conflicts between the party and the ormas.
By establishing coordinating bodies at all levels, these new rules 
allowed much greater party control over the ormas’ activities.70 71
But again, as in 1955, only a few of the coordinating bodies were 
actually created, and these few did very little. Failure to imple­
ment the rules stemmed in fact from a growing disagreement between 
party and ormas leaders over the proper response to issues raised 
during this period of transition to Guided Democracy.
In general, up to 1962 , the leaders of the ormas strongly re­
sisted efforts to bring them under greater party control because 
the leaders of these ormas were out of sympathy with the party 
leadership. After 1962, however, as the ormas leaders increased 
their power within the party, they tended to reverse their earlier 
stand. If the earlier period was characterized by party-ormas 
conflict, the later period was one of consolidation and increasing 
party control.
At the Congress Working Committee meeting in September 1962, 
new rules were passed to govern party-ormas relations, including 
a requirement that ormas constitutions and by-laws be consonant 
with the party's, with all ideological and political provisions in 
the party constitution and by-laws being applicable to the ormas. 
The new rules gave the party Mguiding authority" (wewenang 
bimbingan) in the selection of ormas leaders, and gave the chairman 
of each ormas unit the right to sit in the leadership council of 
the corresponding party unit. They also provided for reciprocal 
obligations to suspend or dismiss members, initiated by either the 
party or an ormas. 1 The trend towards greater party control over
68. "Laporan Panitia Organisasi Seazas" (Typescript, November 28, 
1953).
69. Letter from the DPP to the local branches, No. DP/1310/Pol/49/ 
f56, November 28, 1956.
70. "Pedoman Pusat No. 1 dan 2,” in Marhaenis Bergerak (Djakarta: 
Pertjetakan Sinda, 1958), I, pp. 22-30.
71. "Keputusan Tentang Kebulatan Front Marhaenis," No. 4/0rg/BPK II/ 
f62, in Keputusan-Keputusan Sidang BPK ke-II, September 12-15, 
1962.
174
the ormas culminated in the inclusion of a plan for a purge of ormas 
leadership in the Deklarasi Marhaenis of November 1964. These changes 
were necessary because the party needed an organized mass following 
in the political situation under Guided Democracy. In practical 
terms, control was made possible by the greatly increased ormas repre­
sentation in the party councils.
In the whole period from 1946 to 1956, no provision had existed 
for ormas representation in the fifty-man National Party Council.
From 1956 tp 1960, when the National Leadership Council was split 
into two bodies, there were ten ormas representatives in the large 
Congress Working Committee of 82 members but none in the more power­
ful thirty-man Central Leadership Council. Between 1960 and 1963, 
there were five ormas representatives in the twenty-man Central 
Leadership Council. After 1963, the proportion was increased to ten 
out of thirty. A similar increase occurred in the leadership coun­
cils of local party units.
The Deklarasi Marhaenis and the 
Party Work Style
The most important changes in party work style in the last years 
of Guided Democracy derived from the new seriousness with which the 
party!s new leadership looked at organizational matters. The 
Deklarasi Marhaenis was important not just for its adoption of new 
ideological formulas but also for its realistic three-year work pro­
gram. In the past, the party!s work programs had mostly consisted 
of bland assertions of party goals without any realistic organiza­
tional plans for their achievement. The Deklarasi Marhaenis called 
for the party to:72
A . January 1, 1965 to December 31, 1965
1. Engage in indoctrination in order to unify interpreta­
tion of party ideology. The adoption of Marxist his­
torical materialism as a method of thought and struggle 
plus increasing our understanding of the conditions 
and the history of the Indonesian peoplefs struggle.
2. Engage in the screening ['penelitian] of the party 
leadership in order to establish conditions for 
changing the leadership at all levels.
3. Engage in the screening of the leadership of all 
party ormas horizontally and vertically in order to 
establish conditions for changing their leadership.
4. Create a corps of "vanguard cadres" from all areas 
of Indonesia who will be made responsible for the 
implementation of "total retooling" in their 
respective areas.
5. To pioneer in and consolidate party work in education, 
culture and sports.
B . January 1, 1966 to December 31, 1966
1. Examine the results of ideological indoctrination in 
the first year, paying particular attention to method 
of thought and style of work.
72. "Deklarasi Marhaenis," in PNI Penegak Pantja Sila, pp. 7-8.
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2. Hold congresses and conferences at all levels in 
order to implement the planned change in party 
leadership to revolutionary elements and to those 
oriented to the needs of labor and the peasantry.
3. Accelerate work in education, culture and sports.
C . January 1, 1967 to December 31, 1967
1. Finalize the implementation of the plan for retool­
ing all party apparatus including all party ormas.
2. Extend revolutionary mass action towards targets 
determined by the party line and the revolutionary 
line.
3. Conduct a full-scale reexamination of the imple­
mentation of this plan.
The most striking new element in the program was the planned 
purge of party and ormas leadership at all levels. Up to this time, 
most suspensions or dismissals from party membership resulted from 
specific violations of party policy. The Deklarasi Marhaenis estab­
lished clear categories of people who would not be allowed to lead 
any of the party or ormas units. The two proscribed groups were: 
big businessmen, or ’’those who are known in their areas as owning 
big commercial or other enterprises” ; and ’’feudal elements, in 
particular landlords who have extensive landholdings, or those who 
have smaller ones but are, in spirit, landlords, in that they ex­
ploit other people in the use of their property.”73 74
The plans for an overall purge of the party leadership came at 
a time of generally increasing central control over local party 
activities. The principle of ’’guided democracy” within the party 
was adopted at the Ninth Party Congress in 1960. The trend toward 
central control accelerated after 1963, as Ali and Surachman began 
to make greater and greater use of young party activists to attend 
provincial and branch conferences.
In order to get more of these activists, the party paid more 
attention to cadre training. The PNI had always paid lip-service 
to the need for cadre training, but before 1960 it had never imple­
mented a concerted program. The few young graduates of cadre train­
ing programs before 1960 more often than not ended up doing menial 
work for the party; they were not integrated into the decision­
making structure. A good index of the new importance given to this 
program after 1960 is the fact that Ali Sastroamidjojo himself 
headed the cadre training section of the party Central Headquarters. 
Between 1961 and 1962, his section conducted one, two-month and 
three, one-month training programs in Djakarta for 101 cadres.
This was followed by programs in the provinces and a few key 
branches for 233 cadres. 4 After the Tenth Party Congress (1963), 
cadre training was greatly accelerated at the branch level and addi­
tional programs were developed by the ormas. In order to reach a 
larger number of party activists, a three-day program of lectures
73. Pendjelasan Pelakasanaan Deklarasi Marhaenis (Mimeographed, June
1965) .
74. Special report of the cadre training section of Central Head­
quarters, in ’’Lampiran IV,” Laporan DPP-PNI kepada Kongres 
ke-X.
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on party history, ideology and organization by Sukarno and party 
leaders was held for some 15,000 cadres from all over the country 
in March 1965. The party also took advantage of Ruslan Abdulganifs 
position as head of the governments ideological indoctrination appar­
atus to fill the government-run courses with PNI members.
The August 1965 Purge and the New Leadership
On August 4, 1965, the first and second vice-chairman, the 
deputy secretary-general and four other members of the top leader­
ship of the PNI were suspended from party membership. Over the next 
two months, some 150 other party and ormas leaders all over the 
country were similarly suspended. This, the first major purge in 
the PNI’s history, marked the culmination of the long conflict be­
tween the right-wing and left-wing factions. Its immediate ante­
cedents, however, were developments at the Tenth Party Congress.
The defeat of the right-wing forces at the 1963 congress led 
to their growing isolation in 1964 and 1965. Using their positions 
as chairman and secretary-general of the party, Ali Sastroamidjojo 
and Surachman had gradually increased the number of their leftist 
supporters in national and local party councils. With Sukarnofs 
encouragement, plus the generally leftward trend in national politics 
at that time, they managed to push the right-wing faction into a 
minority position on major party issues over the next two years.
The first major disagreement occurred over the party's response 
to aksi sepihak. Although the PNI left-wing faction took an ambiv­
alent position, it definitely opposed any right-wing support to the 
landlords. The Ali-Surachman leadership also worried increasingly 
about the confrontation between the PNI and the PKI in the provinces. 
The right-wing forces, on the other hand, considered central leader­
ship cooperation with the PKI on national issues as a betrayal of 
the party's local units who were under pressure from the PKI. The 
adoption of the Deklarasi Marhaenis in November 1964 marked a vic­
tory of the left-wing faction on these and other issues, and its 
projected purge of the party leadership constituted a direct threat 
to the right-wing.
In response, the right-wing forces, led by elements in the 
powerful Central Java committee, heightened their confrontation 
with the PKI and attacked the left-wing faction in the national 
leadership. At an emergency conference of the Central Java PNI on 
March 6, 1965, it was decided that a delegation would be sent to the 
Central Headquarters to report on PKI attacks against the PNI in the 
province. The delegation also urged that the KBM secretary-general, 
Martiman, be reprimanded for accusing the Central Java committee 
chairman Hadisubeno of being a BPS supporter.75 A similar complaint 
was lodged against Surachman for his speech in Bangari blaming the
75. The BPS (Badan Pendukung Sukarnoisme, Body for the Support of 
Sukarnoism) was part of a campaign by a group of anti-Communist 
newspapers in 1964, directed against the PKI and claiming to 
defend the true ideas of Sukarnoism against that party's perver­
sion of them. Powerful anti-Communist groups such as the Army 
General Staff and various civilian politicians supported the 
campaign.
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police for the violence at an aksi sepihak incident in Ketaon, 
Bojolali. Ali seems to have responded favorably to the delegation's 
report. But the subsequent publication of the report plus a 
violent attack on the PKI in the Buku Putih pamphlet in April, 
embarrassed Central Headquarters,76 for it subjected the PNI as a 
whole to accusations of having "Communist-phobia" and destroying 
the unity of the national-revolutionary forces.
In an effort to mitigate the effect of the Central Java PNI's 
campaign against the PKI and to stop its attacks on the PNI left- 
wing faction; a meeting of the Central Leadership Council, held on 
May 12-13, 1965, decided that Hadisubeno should step down as chair­
man of the Central Java leadership council and also that the Central 
Java leadership should stop distributing the Buku Putih.77 At a 
working conference of the Central Java branches on May 22, 1965, the 
Central "Headquarters' decisions were accepted "in the interest of 
party unity."78 But Hadisubeno himself continued giving speeches 
throughout the province which attacked the national party leadership 
and the PKI. He justified this continued activity on the basis of 
his membership in the Central Leadership Council, and a letter from 
Hardi and Isnaeni, respectively first vice-chairman and deputy 
secretary-general, authorizing him to "consolidate party and ormas 
branches in Central Java."79
At the same time, Central Headquarters was being subjected to 
increasingly strong pressure from President Sukarno to dismiss 
Marhaenis gadungan (lit. fake Marhaenists) from the party. Sukarno 
first used the phrase during his speech at the big party cadre train­
ing program on March 24, 1965.80 In May, he identified Marhaenis 
gadungan as being those who are "plintat-plintut [opportunist], 
Nasakom-phobic, big capitalists, feudal landlords, anti-Deklarasi 
Marhaenists, anti-Deklarasi Bogorists, and those who oppose defining 
Marhaenism as Marxism adapted to Indonesian conditions."81 He con­
tinued to push party leaders on this during private meetings with 
them in May and June.82 * At his speech during the July 25 mass meet­
ing celebrating the 38th party anniversary, he chided party leaders
76. Adjakan PNI/Front Marhaenis Djawa Tengah.
77. "Tentang Brosur dan Pamphlet DPD-PNI Djawa Tengah," Keputusan 
No. 234/K.U./015/kpts/'65, in Deppenprop DPP-PNI, Tendang 
Keluar Marhaenis-Marhaenis Gadungan (Djakarta: Pertjetakan 
Sulindo, 1965), pp. 44-46.
78. "Kesimpulan Konperensi Kerdja Tjabang-Tjabang PNI se-Djawa 
Tengah, May 22 , 1965 ," in Ibid. , pp. 47-48.
79. Surat Tugas, No. 226/Org/069/'65, May 28 , 1965 , in Ibid., p. 51.
80. Pedoman Pokok Pelaksanaan Deklarasi Marhaenis (Djakarta: 
Deppenprop DPP-PNI , 1965) , p~! 30.
81. Suluh Indonesia, May 31, 1965.
82. Ali's reports on his conversations with Sukarno on this matter
are contained in Risalah Lengkap Sidang DPP-Pleno, August 4,
1965 (Mimeographed). '
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for not having started the purge.83
In the week after Sukarno!s speech, the KBM, Petani, GMNI, GPM, 
GSNI, and the Gera'kan Nelajan Marhaenis (Marhaenist Fishermenf s Move­
ment] issued resolutions urging the party to expel Hadisubeno, Hardi, 
and Isnaeni.81* Responding to this pressure, the party leadership 
decided to include the issue on the agenda for the already-scheduled 
meeting of the Central Leadership Council on August 4, 1965. Though 
invitations had been sent to all members of the Council, six members 
refused to attend. A letter, signed by Hardi, Isnaeni, Osa Maliki, 
Mohammad Achmad, Sabillal Rasjad and Karim Moh. Durjat and sent to 
all Central Leadership Council members on August 3, explained that 
their refusal was based on their belief that, because of the existing 
tension within the Central Leadership Council, nothing could be accom­
plished at the meeting. Instead, they proposed that an emergency 
party congress be held to repair the schisms within the party.85 
They based the proposal on the expectation that such a congress would 
give them time to mobilize remaining centers of right-wing strength 
in the provinces. In the Central Headquarters and in the tense 
political world of Djakarta at that time, they were hopelessly iso­
lated. Since the defeat of the right-wing faction at the 1963 party 
congress, Ali and Surachman had successfully managed to gain control 
of the Central Leadership Council and the headquarters staff and to 
relegate Hardi, Osa Maliki and Isnaeni to the performance of minor 
functions.8 6
In the light of these events, the decision of the August 4,
1965 Central Leadership Council meeting to suspend Hardi, Osa Maliki, 
Hadisubeno, Mohammad Achmad, Sabillal Rasjad, Karim Moh. Durjat and 
Isnaeni was almost anti-climactic. The decision was unanimous among 
the twenty members of the Council who attended the meeting.87 In a 
letter explaining the decision, sent out on August 10, 1965, emphasis 
was placed on the gro.upTs violations of party discipline.88 89 In a 
later pamphlet put out by the partyfs information section, the deci­
sion was explained in ideological and historical terms, which branded 
the purged group as ’’liberal/’ anti-Guided Democracy, and Communist- 
phobic. They were accused of having supported the Liga Demokrasi in 
1960, the BPS in 1964 and a host of other ’’crimes” against the 
party.8 9
The purged group denied the accusations and insisted that,
83. Suluh Indonesia, July 26, 1965.
84. Tendang Keluar, pp. 70-87.
85. ’’Pentingnja Kongres Luar Biasa,” in Ibid. , pp. 49-50.
86. For example, a pamphlet issued under the names of Hardi, Osa and 
Isnaeni entitled, Siapakah jang Sebenarnja Marhaenis Gadungan? 
(Mimeographed, September 19, 1965).
87. Risalah Lengkap Sidang DPP-Pleno, August 4, 1965.
88. Pendjelasan Departemen Organisasi DPP-PNI Tentang Keputusan DPP-
PNI, August 4, 1965 (Mimeographed).
89. Tendang Keluar.
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according to the partyTs constitution and by-laws, they had not 
violated party discipline. They counter-attacked by accusing Ali 
himself of political crimes, pointing out that he had worked for 
the Dutch before the war and had compromised the party's revolution­
ary program by agreeing to stop attacks on SOKSI. They charged 
Surachman and the other young leaders of the left-wing faction with 
having ndestroyed party unity.”90
The purged group also organized meetings of their followers in 
West and Central Java. On August 20, 1965, a meeting was held in 
Banjudono (Bojolali, Central Java), which was attended by leaders 
from several Central Java branches. This group sent a letter to 
Sukarno asking him to freeze the Ali-Surachman leadership group and 
to appoint a caretaker leadership which could organize an emergency 
party congress.91 A similar meeting held in Subang, West Java, on 
August "22 , 1965 , also urged the holding of an emergency congress.
Less openly critical in its attitude towards the Ali leadership, the 
West Java group formed a "consultative Body for the Development of 
the PNI/FM and Marhaenism," to promote party unity.92 The 
Banjudono and Subang groups, plus a smaller one from East Java, 
met at Bandung on September 13, 1965 to plan a common strategy.93 94
At the same time as the purged group was busy seeking support 
for its proposal for an emergency congress, the Ali-Surachman leader­
ship was actively consolidating its own position. Teams of party 
activists fanned out into the provinces to explain the purge and 
to gather information on the purged groupTs activities. Everyone 
identified with the purged group or present at the Subang or 
Banjudono meetings was summarily dismissed from the party.91* New 
leaders were appointed or elected at emergency conferences to re­
place purged ones.
The Ali-Surachman leadership clearly had the upper hand at 
this time. Though the purged group claimed loyalty to Sukarno, it 
was generally known that Sukarno favored the Ali-Surachman group, 
which also had strong support from the major ormas and from most of 
the party's branches. Other political parties issued statements
90. Siapakah jang Sebenarnja Marhaenis Gadungan?; Hardi, ejt. al. , 
Kebenaran Menggugat (August 19 , 1965); Isnaeni, Menj ingkap 
Tabir KepalsuanT
91. "Tjatatan Musjawarah Banjudono" (Typescript, August 20, 1965); 
a mimeographed letter to Sukarno on August 20 signed by 
eleven Central Java branch leaders.
92. Speech by Sanusi Hardjadinata to the meeting; Pengumuman No. 
l/Peng/'65 Badan Musjawarah Pembina PNI/FM Djawa Barat 
(Mimeographed, August 24, 1965).
93. A Badan Musjawarah Pembina PNI/FM Djawa Timur, under the lead­
ership of Abd. Martak and Darmansjah, was formed on August 30, 
1965. Information on the meeting is contained in notes taken 
by Mohd. Achmad.
94. "Fungsionaris PNI/GMM jang Ditindak oleh Ali-Surachman" (Type­
script) , contains a list of 138 party leaders who were purged.
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saying that they recognized only the Ali leadership.95 On September 
6, 1965, the national police commander, Sutjipto Judodihardjo, in­
structed all local police commanders to prohibit activities by 
"Marhaenis gadungan."96 97 Though it is possible that the top army 
leadership at that time favored the Hardi group, the most it could 
do was to instruct regional military authorities not to interfere 
in PNI affairs.9 7
From Victory to Disaster
The August 1965 purge was the culmination of developments with­
in the PNI that had started in the late 'fifties. The changes in 
party ideology paralleled those in organization, making the PNI of 
1965 a substantially different political party from that led by 
Sidik in the early 'fifties and even more so from that led by 
Suwirjo in 1956. The PNI in the 'fifties was largely a patronage 
machine. In the 'sixties, it slowly changed into a political move­
ment focused on mass organization and based on a radical and radi­
calizing ideology.98
The process was nowhere near complete by September 1965. By 
compromising with the Army on the Fifth Force and the SOKSI issues, 
and not taking a firm stand against landlords in the aksi sepihak 
controversy, the "new" PNI showed much of the political indecisive­
ness of its predecessor. The party's position on these issues per­
haps resulted from its search for allies in competition with the
95. Suluh Indonesia, September 16, 1965, contains the Partindo and 
PKI statements; Ibid., September 22, 1965, the NU statement;
Ibid., September 20, 1965, the Perti statement.
96. Suluh Indonesia, September 7, 1965.
97. A copy of the KOTI telegram to the provincial Pepelrada, dated 
August 21 , 1965 , No. T-0206/G-5/1965, was appended to a letter 
from Osa Maliki and Isnaeni to the national police commander pro­
testing his order; the letter was dated September 8, 1965 and 
appeared in mimeographed form.
98. The increasing ascendancy of the left was paralleled by striking
changes in the age and regional origin of the top party leader­
ship. In 1950, the fifty-man National Party Council was a rela­
tively young leadership with an average age of 41.5 years. Be­
cause almost all of the same people still led the party in 1956, 
the average age by then had risen to 47.9. The influx of new 
leaders from the provinces after the 1956 congress slowed the 
aging process in the national leadership so that in the three- 
year period from 1956 to 1959, the average age of the Council 
only rose 1.1 years to 49. After 1960, however, the leadership's 
average age dropped steadily: from 49 in 1959; to 47.3 in 1962;
46.5 in 1964; and, finally, after the August 1965 purge, to 42.9 years.
In the same period, the proportion of Javanese and non- 
Javanese in the national leadership shifted consistently in 
favor of the latter: 33 Javanese to 16 non-Javanese in 1950;
19 to 12 in 1956; 16 to 12 in 1959; 9 to 11 in 1962; and 12 to 18 in 1964.
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PKI. These decisions might also be explained in terms of the influ­
ence of remaining older elements at the very top of the party 
leadership. Except for Surachman, the top six leaders of the 
party in September 1965 were older men whose political experience 
dated back to the early ffifties. Though they had taken left- 
wing positions on the major issues within the party in the past 
few years, they retained a middle-of-the-road orientation in the 
national political arena. They would almost certainly have 
been replaced at the party congress scheduled for 1966. But 
it will never be known what would have become of the PNI in such 
such an event. For the coup of October 1, 1965 meant the end 
of the PNI move to the left.
